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Three key issues have raised wide attention during the Great Recession. They
are jobless recoveries in the U.S., the excessive leverage of global banking sector,
and sovereign defaults in Europe. This dissertation studies each of them by
chapter, yet they are all related to financing, from firms’ financial conditions, to
banks’ borrowing, to countries’ debt. Together, they concern about the relation
between macroeconomics and finance from different angles.
First, U.S. employment has recovered 3-6 quarters later relative to output
recoveries in the post-1990 period, this has not happened before 1990s during
the post-war period, which is what many call jobless recoveries. My first study
explores how much firms’ financial conditions (i.e., borrowing capacity) and
firm-paid employee benefits (including health insurance cost) have contributed
to the jobless recoveries, using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model. The paper makes four main contributions: 1) I document tighter finan-
cial conditions during recent three recoveries comparing to the ones before and
show its impact on jobless recoveries and employment volatilities. 2) I docu-
ment the underexplored cyclicality of per worker benefit costs and show that
the costs decline during recessions and increase during recoveries. Moreover,
the increases of per worker benefit costs during recent recoveries have become
larger. 3) Using the financial conditions, the pro-cyclicality of benefit costs, and
the costs’ rising trend, this model produces 3-to-7-quarter delays in employ-
ment recoveries relative to business cycle troughs for the 1990, 2001, and 2007
recessions and no delay for the pre-1990 period. This is consistent with the data
that has scarcely been matched in previous literature. 4) The calibrated model
generates more than 76 percent of employment volatility, as well as most of the
volatility in per worker hours and in output.
The second study, coauthored with Ruud de Mooij and Tigran Poghosyan,
explores how corporate taxes affect the capital structure of multinational banks.
Guided by a theory of optimal capital structure, it tests (i) whether local taxes in-
duce subsidiary banks to raise leverage in light of traditional debt bias; and (ii)
whether cross-country tax differences affect intra-bank capital structure through
international debt shifting. Using a novel data set for 558 commercial bank
subsidiaries of the 86 largest multinational banks in the world, we find that
taxes matter significantly, through both the debt bias channel and the interna-
tional debt shifting. Our results imply that taxation causes international debt
spillovers through multinational banks.
Last, there has been a long established relationship between default and in-
ternational trade in the empirical literature, however, its theoretical counterpart
is scarce. My third study models the trade impact of endogenous default in a
stochastic dynamic framework of two open economies that features incomplete
financial markets and currency crisis (exchange rate depreciation). In the model,
the exchange rate collapses due to default, therefore affecting GDP and goods
trade. It predicts post-default deteriorating imports and rising exports, which is
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Three key issues have raised wide attention during the Great Recession. They
are jobless recoveries in the U.S., the excessive leverage of global banking sector,
and sovereign defaults in Europe. This dissertation studies each of them by
chapter, yet they are all related to financing, from firms’ financial conditions, to
banks’ borrowing, to countries’ debt. Together, they concern about the relation
between macroeconomics and finance from different angles.
First, to examine the U.S. jobless recoveries, I ask: how much can firms’ fi-
nancial frictions and firm paid employment benefit costs explain U.S. recent
employment movement? This is to study the aggregate employment impact
not only of firms’ financial conditions but also of the underexplored cyclical em-
ployee benefit costs that firms need to pay. I find that both factors have signif-
icant effects on the delayed employment recovery timing during the post-1990
period, with financial conditions also stimulating employment volatility. Using
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, this research generates
much better match to employment fluctuation depth and timing than previous
works.
It is not only firms’ financial conditions that have raised attention during
the crises but also banks’. In the second research project, my coauthors Ruud
de Mooij, Tigran Poghosyan and I seek to answer: How does corporate taxes
affect the capital structure of multinational banks? Previously, many have stud-
ied regulatory impact on bank leverage, our work is among the first to examine
potential fiscal impact. The reason for taxation to affect any corporate’s leverage
has to do with a rich literature on debt bias. Due to the deduction of debt in-
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terest expenses out of tax base, firms have incentives to raise leverage in a high
tax regime. It is particularly interesting for multinational companies, because
potentially they can manipulate their subsidiaries’ leverage according to host
countries’ tax rates, in order to save tax payment as a group. We focus our ex-
ercise on multinational banks, which is timely relevant to G8 summit’s concern
on tax evasion.
Last but not least, many advanced countries’ government financial status
have also called for attention, along with firms’ financing constraint and banks’
high leverage, especially in Europe. Indeed, the Great Recession has showed
us that sovereign debt is closely related to the private sectors as bailout cost
can severe sovereign default risks. Given this relation and the rising sovereign
debt burden in advanced countries, in the last chapter I build a two-country
DSGE model and examine how sovereign default may affect international trade
between countries, through post-default currency crisis.
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter II presents my study on
the U.S. jobless recoveries, Chapter III on multinational banks’ leverage, and
Chapter IV on sovereign defaults. The data, tables, figures, and technical details
are included in the appendix.
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CHAPTER 2
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, BENEFIT COSTS, AND EMPLOYMENT
DYNAMICS IN RECENT U.S. RECOVERIES
2.1 Introduction
U.S. employment dynamics have changed significantly since the mid-1980s.
This is true for both the depth of declines in employment during recessions,
and the timing of its recoveries afterwards. In particular, the left panel of Fig-
ure A.1 plots cumulative employment growth for the 15 quarters immediately
following NBER business cycle peaks into the pre-1990, 1990, 2001 and 2007 re-
cessions, respectively. The 1990 and 2001 downturns suffered employment de-
clines as deep as those in the pre-1990 period, for roughly 3 percent. During the
2007 recession, by contrast, employment plummeted more than twice as much
to nearly 8 percent below its previous peak.
Moreover, it has taken longer time in the three most recent recoveries for
employment to return to its previous peak level, as shown in Figure A.1 (left).
To examine employment recovery timing more closely, the right panel of Fig-
ure A.1 plots cumulative employment growth for 10 quarters following NBER
business cycle troughs. The lowest point on each line is the actual employment
trough. In the post-1990 recessions, employment troughs have been reached
3-to-6 quarters later than the NBER business cycle troughs at point zero in the
plot, while after previous recessions employment recovered at most one quarter
later than output did.1 Most of the previous studies have not closely replicated
1The same conclusion follows when I compare employment troughs with actual output
troughs.
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these new puzzling phenomena of the employment dynamics in recent U.S. re-
coveries. In this paper I attempt to make some progress along these dimensions.
This paper’s results cover seven NBER business cycles since 1964.2 I focus
on three factors that have contributed to these changes in the post-1990 U.S. em-
ployment dynamics: (1) relatively earlier adjustments to per worker hours than
to employment, (2) rising employment benefit costs (including health insurance
cost) and the cyclicality of those costs, as well as (3) firms’ financial conditions.3
I build a DSGE model with an explicit role for each of the contributing factors.
Particularly, the intuition for the employment impact of benefit costs is simple.
Majority of the benefit costs (including health insurance, defined benefit plans,
paid leaves, etc) are quasi-fixed, that is, they increase with number of workers
but not per worker hours, so changes in per worker benefit costs can alter the
tradeoff between per worker hours and employment.
During the early stages of a recession, employers decrease per worker hours
and cut employee benefits to reduce labor costs while retaining workers (Rich-
tel, 2008; Hallock, Strain and Webber, 2012). However, as the recession deepens,
firms eventually have to lay off some employees. In the wake of a recovery,
firms’ benefit costs rise, they increase per worker hours as a buffer (Schreft,
Singh and Hodgson, 2005) but do not hire new workers or even continue firing.
Moreover, firms are financially constrained from expanding production and the
2The recessions started in 1969, 1973, 1980, 1981, 1990, 2001, and 2007, respectively.
3In this paper, financial conditions refer to a trio of financial constraint, shocks and frictions.
The financial constraint specifies a firm’s borrowing capacity without default, whose tightness
can be changed by the financial shocks. The financial frictions reflect the firm’s flexibility in ad-
justing its financial structure under a tighter or looser financial constraint. Other contributing
factors to the recent slow employment recoveries may include increasing imports and immigra-
tion, declining union, technological progress, job polarization, industry reallocation, economic
and policy uncertainties, and slow output growth. However, a survey by the National Fed-
eration of Independent Business finds that high health insurance cost is the most significant
problem faced by U.S. small businesses in 2008 and 2012 (The Economist, 2012).
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workforce.
This paper makes four main contributions to the literature. First, I document
tighter financial conditions during recent three recoveries comparing to the ones
before and study its impact on employment. I find financial conditions signif-
icant for both the employment’s volatility and its delayed recoveries. Particu-
larly, with the financial conditions alone, my model can generate 2-to-7-quarter
delays relative to NBER business cycle troughs for the employment recoveries
following the 1990, 2001, and 2007 recessions. But they also produce excessive
employment volatilities than data.
My second contribution is documenting the underexplored cyclicality of per
worker benefit costs.4 I show that the cyclical components of benefit costs and
employment growth display a positive correlation, and this relationship has
been evolving as the benefit costs’ trend has soared over the past two decades.
Third, I incorporate these dynamic benefit costs and their changing relationship
with employment growth into my business cycle model and find that they are
important mechanisms for capturing the recent sluggish employment recover-
ies. More specifically, the dynamic benefit costs alone enable my model to de-
liver 1-to-6-quarter delays relative to NBER business cycle troughs for the em-
ployment recoveries following the most recent three recessions.
Last, I put together the two mechanisms, benefit costs and financial con-
4This paper does not aim to explain the reasons for the cyclicality of per worker benefit
costs, but use this observation. Yet, briefly, from the literature on health insurance underwriting
cycles and related premium fluctuations, Kipp, Cookson, and Mattie (2003) find that strong
economic growth (as firms seek to attract workers) and prior low reserve investment return
during recessions generally accelerate growth in health insurance costs for the private sector at
the beginning of recoveries. Also, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) report the substitution effects
between public health insurance programs and the private. The former expenditure usually
declines during recoveries and is made up by the private sector. These evidence is consistent
with my observation.
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ditions, enabling the model to generate 3-to-7-quarter delays of employment
recoveries for the post-1990 period while generating no delay before that and
to deliver more than 76 percent of employment volatility for the post-1990 pe-
riod. This is in line with the data that has scarcely been matched in the previous
literature. Moreover, the model with both mechanisms does not generate exces-
sive employment volatilities and can still explain about 86 percent of the cyclical
fluctuation.
The central feature of my model is the pecking order in firms’ labor input
adjustment decisions between per worker hours and employment. Increasing
hours is preferred to increasing employment in the wake of recent recoveries
because of the constrained financial conditions, the rising trend in employment
benefit costs as well as the pro-cyclicality of those costs. The empirical evidence
for this is strong, as shown in the next two subsections.
2.1.1 Per Worker Hours
Figure A.2 (left) shows that indeed per worker hours have recovered earlier
than employment has for the post-1990 period, by 1-to-5 quarters, while after
previous recessions they always recovered at the same quarter. Additionally,
there has been an upward trend in overtime, from 3.3 hours for the pre-1990
period to 4.3 hours since then (Figure A.2, right), which suggests a changing
tradeoff between hours and workers such that firms would rather increase per
worker hours than hire more workers.5 Hence, I include both extensive and
5However, one may question this insofar as the standard deviation of cyclical per worker
hours has declined from 0.0047 before 1990 to 0.0042 since then. But under the Great Mod-
eration, in fact, since 1984, volatility in per worker hours has increased relative to that of em-
ployment (Barnichon, 2010), and there has been increasing use of per worker hours rather than
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intensive labor margins in my model to enable the choice between them.
2.1.2 Financial Conditions
Figure A.3 reflects firms’ financial conditions from data. Its top panel shows
credit supply, which tightens during recessions and gradually loosens in re-
cent recoveries. The bottom panel depicts for longer period de-facto procyclical
credit conditions through debt flows as a percentage of GDP. Overall, finan-
cial situations are unpleasant for firms during economic downturns, exhibiting
pro-cyclicality. Particularly, during the post-1990 period the financial conditions
have worsened more significantly during recessions, and following the 1990 and
2001 recessions, they did not improve very well until two years later. Whereas
before 1990s, firms’ financial conditions improved much faster right out reces-
sions.
When a firm’s financial condition worsens (i.e., borrowing constraint tight-
ens), it could choose to adjust its financial structure by cutting debt and reduc-
ing dividends to stock shareholders (Jermann and Quadrini, 2012), or decrease
investment and labor costs. However, financial frictions exist regarding the
flexibility with which a firm can change its financial structure (Lintner, 1956).6
Therefore, the firm has to shrink investment and labor cost instead; hence, the
financial conditions are related to the real business activities, especially deeper
employment declines.7
employment as labor input adjustments.
6Lintner (1956) shows that managers are concerned about smoothing dividends over time, a
fact further confirmed by subsequent studies.
7Empirical evidence is found in Sharpe (1994), Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Campello, Gra-
ham, and Harvey (2010), Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011), and Duygan-Bump, Levkov,
and Montoriol-Garriga (2011), Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello (2012). However, one may doubt
7
The financial condition mechanism in my model is exactly as the evidence
described above suggests it should be: when a negative innovation to financial
conditions (i.e., a negative financial shock) tightens a firm’s financial constraint,
the firm has to cut its labor cost instead of adjusting its financial structure due to
the frictions in the latter.8 In this respect my paper is closely related to Jermann
and Quadrini (2012). However, they focus upon the impact of financial condi-
tions on total hours rather than employment and its recent slow recoveries. In
my model, the financial conditions, by themselves (without benefit costs), raise
employment volatility too much beyond what is in the data; however, when I
factor in the dynamic benefit costs, their impact is smoothed and generates a
close match with the employment data. More specifically, the benefit costs pre-
vent employment from adjusting immediately as a response to financial shocks.
Altogether, the model explains more than 76 percent of employment volatility.
2.1.3 The Trend and Cyclicality of Benefit Costs
Employment-based benefits no longer represent only a fringe cost. A moder-
ate estimation of benefit costs in real terms topped 14310 USD per employee
(25 percent of total compensation) in 2004, from 5134 USD (14 percent) in 1964
(Figure A.4, left). It also has been growing much faster than wages (Figure
A.4, right). This relative suppression of wages gives firms an incentive to in-
crease per worker hours more than employment in the wake of recent recover-
how important the financial constraint is for big firms that hoard cash. For them the delay in
hiring more workers during recoveries may have to do with self-austerity and factors other than
credit, such as the quasi-fixed employment costs.
8In the model, financial constraint is an enforcement constraint for borrowing without de-
fault, reflecting the firm’s capacity to issue bonds from its existing debt and output after de-
ducting investment expenditure. More information can be found in the Model section. Also, I
exclude firms’ default possibilities throughout the paper.
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ies. More importantly, Figure A.5 shows the cyclicality of the real per worker
benefit costs (HP-filtered, with a standard deviation of 0.0106), suggesting vary-
ing employment-hour tradeoffs during recessions and recoveries. In particular,
at the beginning of a recovery, per worker benefit costs rise, increasing the cost
of hiring an additional employee relative to the cost of increasing per worker
hours.
Figure A.5 also displays a positive correlation between the cyclical compo-
nents of per worker benefit costs and employment growth.9 Benefit costs move
above its trend at about the same time employment growth does. Based on this
observation, I quantify the per worker benefit costs using a dynamic function of
labor market employment growth in my model, where better (or worse) labor
market conditions (additional (or less) employment) increases (or decreases) the
marginal benefit costs today but decreases (increases) the costs in the next pe-
riod. This generates an incentive for expanding firms to keep hiring into the
beginning of a recession while shrinking firms continue firing into the wake of
a recovery, which is in line with data. This is one of the two main mechanisms
(the other is financial conditions) in my model for generating the post-1990 slow
employment recoveries.
Furthermore, from Figure A.5 we can see that after 1989 the same percent-
age increases above the trend of per worker benefit costs appear to correspond
with lower positive employment growth. Intuitively, this is consistent with the
fact that the level of benefit costs has been trending upwards: the same percent-
age increase above their higher trend results in a larger rise in the dollar value
of the benefit costs and a heavier burden on firms to hire new workers, which
9See Parameterization section and Figure A.8 for a more precise measure of their correlation.
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discourages employment growth.10 In the model calibration, to measure this
change quantitatively, I estimate the positive relationship between the cyclical
components of per worker benefit costs and employment growth using OLS,
and show that indeed it has evolved since 1990 as indicated by Figure A.5.11
Therefore, given the benefit costs’ trend and changing cyclical relationship with
employment growth, I employ different parameter values of the benefit costs
and of the cyclical benefit-employment relationship for the pre-1990 and post-
1990 periods. Together with financial conditions, they are the key to my model’s
ability to use the same mechanism to deliver the delayed employment recover-
ies in the post-1990 period but not before.
The benefit cost mechanism employed in this paper share some similarities
with DeLoach and Platania (2008) and Bachmann (2009). My model substan-
tially differs, however, in two important dimensions. First, the benefit costs
considered in my firms’ labor input decisions are dynamic, reflecting endoge-
nous employment changes. This generates significantly slower aggregate em-
ployment adjustments as in the data than a fixed or stochastic labor adjustment
cost can in the existing literature. Second, I further incorporate financial con-
ditions that interact with benefit costs. Even though the benefit costs alone
(with productivity shocks) can allow the model to explain up to 49 percent of
employment volatility for the post-1990 period, the volatility result is greatly
strengthened when I include financial conditions, since they have been play-
ing an increasingly crucial role in affecting real activities such as production
and employment (Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and Montoriol-Garriga, 2011; Calvo,
Coricelli, and Ottonello, 2012).
10Throughout this paper, I assume that all workers receive benefits once they are hired. An
extension can be made to ease this assumption.
11See Parameterization section for more details.
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The paper is structured as follows. Since employment benefit costs are less
familiar to macroeconomists in general, section II presents additional empirical
facts pertaining to quasi-fixed employment costs, i.e. the more general overall
costs that include benefit costs as well as others which are associated with em-
ployment. In the same section, I also provide a brief theoretical literature review
on recent slow employment recoveries. Section III proposes a simple DSGE
model that includes firms’ dynamic benefit costs, financial conditions, and the
tradeoff between extensive and intensive labor margins. Section IV studies the
quantitative properties of the model, and Section V concludes.
2.2 Quasi-fixed Employment Costs
and Theoretical Literature Review
2.2.1 Quasi-fixed Employment Costs
Benefit costs are only part of the story for the overall costs that are associated
with employment. More generally, quasi-fixed employment costs are the por-
tions of labor cost that increase with the number of workers but not per worker
hours. They include costs from hiring, firing, employment-based benefits, and
training.12 In fact, the mechanism employed by my model precisely applies to
reoccurring quasi-fixed employment costs that vary with net employment, i.e.,
benefits and training costs; the former, as shown in the previous section, is eas-
ier to measure. Benefit costs are composed of the items in Table A.1. Health and
12Benefits and training vary with the net number of workers, while hiring and firing vary
with the gross amount. They also have different frequencies of reoccurrences.
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life insurance is the largest component in benefit costs and is quasi-fixed. But,
not all of the benefit costs are purely quasi-fixed, about 60 percent is (Ehren-
berg and Smith, 2012). However, even for the benefit costs that are not purely
quasi-fixed, such as defined contribution plans and social security, it rises more
rapidly with new hires than with increased hours. In the model calibration, I
consider all of the benefit costs as purely quasi-fixed.
Recall Figure A.4, benefit costs have been increasing over the past several
decades. In fact, they are not the only quasi-fixed employment costs that have
been rising. According to Oi (1962) and Manning (2010), in 1951 hiring and
training costs in the U.S. equal about 5.4-7.3 percent of the wages. More re-
cently, from the employee results of the BLS 1995 Survey of Employer Provided
Training, I calculate workers’ training cost to be about 9 percent of total wages.13
Manning (2010), using the results from Barron, Berger and Black (1997), also es-
timates that the training cost is within the range of 34-156 percent of monthly
payment for U.S. firms between 1980 and 1993.
In addition, there has been evidence for the cyclical behavior of other quasi-
fixed employment costs besides the benefit costs. Bils (1987) infers that the
marginal employment adjustment cost is cyclical. Majumdar (2007) finds that
the probability that U.S. workers receive company training is procyclical. Blat-
ter, Muehlemann, and Schenker (2012) confirm that the hiring cost depends on
macroeconomic conditions: a one-percentage-point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate reduces average hiring costs by more than five percent.14 This paper
calibrates both the benefit costs and the general quasi-fixed employment costs
(i.e., the benefit costs and the training cost) to use them in the model.
13See Parameterization section for more details about my calculation.
14For a thorough review, refer to Brunello (2009).
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The extant empirical literature supports the position that quasi-fixed em-
ployment costs affect labor structure, leading firms to increase per worker hours
and deter employment growth (Ehrenberg, 1971; Ehrenberg and Schumann,
1982; Gruber, 1994; Beaulieu, 1995; Gruber, 2000; Reber and Tyson, 2004; and
Baicker and Chandra, 2005). In particular, Cutler and Madrian (1998) show that
rising health insurance costs have increased the hours worked by up to 3 per-
cent. More recently, Baicker and Chandra (2006) find that a 10-percent increase
in health insurance premiums reduces the probability of being employed by 1.2
percentage points.
However, opponents may argue that employers can respond to the quasi-
fixed employment cost increases by reducing wages, assuming no rigidity
(Summers, 1989). But, as Currie and Madrian (1999) conclude, little empiri-
cal evidence suggests that a tradeoff between health insurance costs and wages
exists. Anand (2011) also finds that the pass-through of a health insurance cost
increase from firms to workers is only partial. Consequently, firms are forced to
absorb some of the cost increase. Moreover, even if the quasi-fixed employment
cost increase is offset by wage reductions, it still alters the tradeoff that firms
face in allocating employment and per worker hours, leading them to substi-
tute workers for additional hours (Cutler and Madrian, 1998).
2.2.2 Theoretical Literature Review
I categorize theoretical work pertaining the recent slow employment recoveries
into three groups. The first group, which is closely related to mine, argues that
the problem is rooted in the labor market itself. Causes include employment-
13
based health insurance costs (DeLoach and Platania, 2008),15 employment ad-
justment costs and increasing use of flexible work hours with over-time (Bach-
mann, 2009),16 wage rigidity (Shimer, 2010), and the disciplinary role of un-
employment that serves to increase employees’ working effort (Riggi, 2012).17
The second group believes that other non-labor conditions inevitably change,
such as technology progresses and production restructuring, and it takes time
for the labor market to adapt. Those changes include time-consuming technol-
ogy diffusion (Andolfatto and MacDonald, 2006), increasing capital-labor com-
plementarity (Cantore, Levine, and Melina, 2011), firm restructuring and labor
productivity surges (Berger, 2012), job polarization (Jaimovich and Siu, 2012),
and industry reallocation (Garin, Pries, and Sims, 2011).18 However, few exist-
ing papers provide convincing empirical support for their theories while at the
same time delivering good results matching with the data.
The third perspective claims that the prolonged employment loss is simply
due to slow output recoveries in the post-1990 period, because there seems to be
no significant change in the output-employment relationship (Gali, Smets and
Wouters, 2012). To evaluate this finding, Figure A.6 shows that while 2007 finan-
15My paper differs from DeLoach and Platania (2008) in the use of dynamic benefit costs rather
than a fixed cost as well as my inclusion of financial conditions.
16Unlike my dynamic benefit costs associated with endogenous employment growth, Bach-
mann (2009) uses a stochastic employment adjustment cost. It also does not include capital or
financial conditions and finds no good match for employment in deeper recessions such as the
one in 2007.
17For Shimer (2010), it is still ambiguous in the empirical literature whether wages really
have become more rigid in recent decades (Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens, 2009; and Kudlyak,
2010). Riggi (2012)’s theory fails to explain why the recent three employment recoveries have
been different from before.
18Cantore, Levine, and Melina (2011) do not offer much empirical evidence to support
their assumption of increasing capital-labor complementarity. With surging labor productiv-
ity, Berger (2012) cannot explain the fact that firms not only do not hire new workers but also
continue laying off workers into recent recoveries. Also, Manovskii and Bruegemann (2010)
show evidence against Berger’s assumption of changing labor productivity during the recent
two decades. Regarding industry reallocation, controversial empirical evidence has emerged
on this argument (Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan, 2004; Groshen and Potter, 2003; and Lilien,
1982).
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cial crisis suffered the deepest output decline and has experienced the slowest
recovery, the 1990 and 2001 recessions were followed by output recoveries as
fast as the average of the pre-1990 period. However, recall that in Figure A.1 the
employment recoveries from the 1990 and 2001 recessions are shown to have
been delayed significantly compared with the pre-1990 period. Therefore, fac-
tors other than slow output recoveries should also have driven the sluggish
employment recoveries, at least following the 1990 and 2001 recessions. More-
over, the correlation between average cumulative growth of employment and
that of output following NBER business cycle peaks is 0.95 before 1990, but it
drops to merely 0.41 after 1990.19 The relationship between output and employ-
ment indeed has changed. Yet, the slow output recoveries may still contribute
to the slow employment recoveries; however, since output and employment are
endogenous, it is difficult to untangle how much of the former may actually be
caused by the latter, as well as the other way around.
2.3 Model
This section introduces intensive and extensive labor margins, dynamic benefit
costs, and financial conditions to the standard business cycle model. I start with
the description of the environment in which a representative firm operates, as
this is where my model diverges from the standard one. Then I present the
representative household and define general equilibrium.
19Cumulative employment growth for 15 quarters following each NBER business cycle peak
since 1964 is calculated (except for the short 1980 recession). Then, together they are averaged
over the pre-1990 and post-1990 cycles, respectively. The same is done for output.
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2.3.1 Firm
Assume there is a representative firm, with a production function F(z, k, n, h f ) =
zk1−θ[anγ + (1 − a)hγf ]
θ
γ . The variable z is the stochastic level of productivity, k is
capital input, n is employment, and h f is hours per worker. Both k and n are
predetermined, while h f can be changed at the present time. Capital evolves
according to k′ = (1− δ)k+ i, where k′ is next-period capital stock, i is investment
and δ is depreciation rate.
In the model’s production function, employment and per worker hours are
embedded in a general CES function, which is nested in a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion with capital. This captures the idea that while capital is a substitute for
labor input, the substitutability between employment and per worker hours
is flexible. As Feldstein (1967) and Rosen (1968) note, the assumption that
employment and hours worked enter the production function multiplicatively
(i.e., nh f ) may not be a good one. For example, lengthening per worker hours
may have diminishing returns because of increased fatigue; rising employment
does not increase fatigue but typically dilutes the capital-to-labor ratio. There-
fore, adding per worker hours by a given percentage may affect output differ-
ently than increasing the number of workers by the same percentage (Bernanke,
1986). Following a general specification as in Bernanke (1986), I choose the CES
function for labor inputs.20
Apart from wages, the firm also has to pay benefit costs, φ · (n′/n)g, for each
worker hired next period. Importantly, the per worker benefit costs are driven
by market forces, each individual firm has no power in influencing them. But
20Perri and Quadrini (2011) also use a CES formulation for hours and labor utilization, similar
to this paper.
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since this is a representative model all firms behave the same, together they de-
termine the benefit costs per worker. In other words, the benefit cost mechanism
is exogenous to individual firms but at the same time endogenous to the overall
market. Here, n′ is tomorrow’s employment, and φ is steady-state per worker
benefit costs. In fact, more precisely, φ should be the calibrated parameter for
the steady state of overall quasi-fixed employment costs, which ideally include
quasi-fixed benefit costs, training cost, and other reoccurring quasi-fixed em-
ployment costs. The formulation of (n′/n)g is rooted in the observed positive
correlation between the cyclical components of benefit costs and employment
growth, as shown in Figure A.5. g is the parameter for the endogenous relation-
ship between them.21
Together, φ · (n′/n)g produces an above-trend per worker benefit costs when
employment increases and below-trend benefit costs when employment de-
creases, consistent with the data, as shown in Figure A.5. Varying values of
φ and g can capture the rising trend of benefit costs and the changed relation-
ship between the cyclical components of benefit costs and employment growth.
That is, with the same percentage increase above the trend of benefit costs at the
beginning of a recovery, employment grows by smaller steps in the post-1990
period than it did before, i.e. g becomes larger in the post-1990 period.
More importantly, the benefit costs φ · (n′/n)g delay employment adjustments
in a dynamic fashion. If firms are firing, a decrease in the next period employ-
ment n′ lowers their per worker benefit costs, i.e., the marginal benefit of further
firing in the current period – so the firms will have less incentive to lay off too
many workers right away. But next period, as n′ becomes n, the previous em-
ployment decrease will relatively raise the marginal benefit of firing – so the
21See Parameterization section for more precise measure of their relationship.
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firm will continue firing in near future. That is to say, the smaller a firm be-
comes today, the more it shrinks tomorrow. Intuitively, after laying off workers
through a recession, at the beginning of a recovery, firms may continue reduc-
ing employment due to the relatively high benefit from firing. In this sense, the
dynamic benefit cost formulation captures the notion of employment adjust-
ment formation: rather than adjusting a lumpy amount, aggregate employment
changes bit by bit, and the adjustment duration is amplified by extended lay-
off into output recoveries and continued hiring into output recessions, as in the
data.
An alternative way to interpret the per worker benefit cost formulation is
that the total benefit costs n′[φ·(n′/n)g] exhibit convexity. It is expensive for a firm
to recruit a large number of workers at once. In contrast, if the firm faces non-
convex employment costs, then the optimal response to a large productivity
shock is to adjust employment immediately. However, this is not the case for
recent aggregate employment recoveries.22 The dynamic benefit costs are one of
the two main mechanisms in my model for matching recent slow recoveries of
employment.
The firm also uses equity and debt. Equity payout to investors is denoted
by d. Since firms tend to keep a steady stream of dividend flow and find it
costly to adjustment equity payout (Lintner, 1956; and Jermann and Quadrini,
2012), I assume in the model that dividend changes are subject to a quadratic
adjustment cost. Therefore, the actual dividend cost for the firm is ϕ(d) = d+κ(d−
d)2, where parameter κ ≥ 0, and d is the long-run dividend payout target (steady
22Firm-level data seem to show lumpy employment adjustments. But this paper is us-
ing a representative firm to capture aggregate employment, which includes all firms’ non-
simultaneous employment adjustments and entails gradual adjustments. It would be interest-
ing to use a heterogeneous-firm model to study lumpy employment adjustments for each firm
while the aggregate changes remain gradual.
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state). The firm’s debt, denoted by b f , is preferred to equity because of its tax
advantage (i.e., debt bias).23 This is also the assumption made in Hennessy and
Whited (2005) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Given market interest rate r,
the effective gross interest rate for the firm is R = 1 + r(1 − τ), where τ represents
the tax discount.
Using its new debt issues
b′f
R , the firm partially pays its labor cost, investment,
stock shareholders and lenders, but promises to pay the rest upon the realization
of output revenue F(z, k, n, h f ). After production, the firm chooses to repay by
an amount that is exactly equal to F(z, k, n, h f ) according to its budge constraint,
or to default by the same amount:24
b′f
R
+ F(z, k, n, h f ) = k′ − (1 − δ)k + nwh f + n′[φ(n
′
n
)g] + b f + ϕ(d) (2.1)
where the variable w is the hourly wage rate.
In case of a default, the assets left for creditors to take is the market value of




ε being a market evaluation factor. Therefore, the firm would never choose to
default if the market value of assets left for creditors to take is larger than its





) > F(z, k, n, h f ). (2.2)
On the one hand, higher debt and expanding production make the enforce-
ment constraint tighter. On the other hand, higher capital stocks relax the con-
straint. These properties are shared by most of the enforcement or collateral
23See De Mooij (2011) for a comprehensive survey on debt bias.
24Another way to interpret this can be found in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
25The assets of the firm can also be considered as a collateral, and their value constrains the
borrowing capacity of the firm.
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constraints used in the literature (Jermann and Quadrini, 2012). ε is stochastic
and depends on market conditions. Because this variable affects the tightness of
the enforcement constraint and, thus, the borrowing capacity of the firm, I refer
to its stochastic innovations as financial shocks. Therefore, I have two sources of
aggregate uncertainty: the productivity, z, and the financial condition, ε.
To see more clearly how ε affects the financial and production decisions of
the firm, I rewrite the enforcement constraint Equation 2.2, using the budget









)g − b f − d − κ(d − d)2] > F(z, k, n, h f ) (2.3)
At the beginning of each period, k, b f and n are given. The only variables
that are under the control of the firm are the per worker hours, h f , the next-
period employment, n′, and the equity payout, d. Therefore, suppose the en-
forcement constraint is binding and the firm wishes to keep the production
plan unchanged, a negative financial shock (lower ε) requires a reduction in
the per worker hours, h f , the next period employment, n′, or the equity payout,
d. However, since d is rigid to reduce due to the dividend adjustment cost, the
firm has to cut the per worker hours, h f , or the next-period employment, n′. But
between the two, employment adjustment is delayed because of the dynamic
benefit costs. Therefore, the firm will first resort to per worker hours, h f .
Furthermore, a reduction in the per worker hours, in turn, increases the
firm’s desire to pay a lower wage for additional hours worked. As the hourly
wage drops, it deters the firm from hiring new workers because hours become
relatively cheaper than workers given that quasi-fixed employment costs remain
unchanged. Therefore, wage movements also work like an endogenized cyclical
adjustment cost.
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Now I write the firm’s problem recursively. The endogenous states are the
capital stock k, the employment n, and the debt b f . The exogenous aggregate
states are the productivity z and the financial conditions ε. The firm chooses
its per worker hours h f , dividends d, next-period employment n′, capital k′,
and debt b′f . The optimization problem is subject to its budget and financial
constraints.
V(z, ε, k, n, b f ) = max
h f ,d,k′,n′,b′f
{






+ F(z, k, n, h f ) = k′ − (1 − δ)k + nwh f + n′[φ · (n
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n





) > F(z, k, n, h f ) (2.6)
in which ϕ(d) = d+κ(d−d)2, F(z, k, n, h f ) = zk1−θ[anγ+(1−a)hγf ]
θ
γ , and R = 1+r(1−τ).
Function V(z, ε, k, n, b f ) is the cumulative-dividend market value of the firm,
and m′ is its stochastic discount factor. The stochastic discount factor, wage and
interest rate are determined in the general equilibrium and are taken as given
by the firm.
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the enforcement con-
straint by µ, the first-order conditions for h f , n′, k′, and b′f are:
Fh(z, k, n, h f ) =
wn
















+ εµϕd(d) = 1 (2.10)
Especially important here is the optimality condition for h f , Equation 2.7.
As usual, the marginal productivity of hours is equalized to its marginal cost.
The marginal cost is all workers’ hourly wages augmented by a wedge that de-
pends on the effective tightness of the enforcement constraint, µϕd(d). A tighter
constraint (i.e., higher µ) increases the effective costs of per worker hours and
reduces its demand. Additionally, from Equations 2.9 and 2.10, it is clear that
there is a negative relationship between ε and the constraint’s multiplier µ.
In other words, a negative financial shock to ε makes the multiplier µ higher,
the enforcement constraint tighter, and thus the demand for per worker hours
lower. Therefore, the main channel through which financial shocks are trans-
mitted to the real economy is labor demand, particularly by affecting the per
worker hours before the employment.
2.3.2 Household, Government and General Equilibrium
Assume there is a representative household maximizing its expected lifetime
utility Vh subject to its budget. The household is the stock and bond share-
holder of the firm. Its optimization problem is shown recursively below. The
household chooses hours it would like to work hh, consumption c, stock and
bond shares to hold next period, s′ and b′h. The household takes stock price q,
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interest rate r, employment n, wage w, and tax as given.
Vh(s, bh) = max
hh,c,s′,b′h
{












g]. Notice that the household’s disutility towards working applies
only to those who are employed, and benefits contribute to the entire house-
hold’s utility but are not counted as a part of disposable income in the budget.
The first-order conditions with respect to hh, bh, and s′ are:
wnUc(c, n, hh) + Uhh(c, n, hh) = 0 (2.13)
Uc(c, n, hh) = β
R − τ
1 − τEUc(c
′, n′, h′h) (2.14)
Uc(c, n, hh)q = βE(d′ + q′)Uc(c′, n′, h′h) (2.15)
The first two conditions determine the supply of hours and the interest rate.









The firm’s optimization is consistent with that of the household. Therefore,
its stochastic discount factor is m′ = βUc′/Uc.
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Government collects tax from the household to subsidize the firm’s borrow-
ing. B is the total borrowing in the economy by the firm, and the government








In equilibrium, all markets clear when bh = b f = B, s = 1, h f = hh, and
c = F(z, k, n, h f ) − k′ + (1 − δ)k − n′[φ( n′n )g] − κ(d − d)2. I can now provide the
definition of a general equilibrium. The aggregate states are the productivity z,
the financial condition ε, the capital k, the bond b, and the employment n.
Definition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of functions for
(i) a household’s policies s, c, hh, and b′h; (ii) a firm’s policies d, h f , n
′, k′, and b′f ;
(iii) the firm’s value V(z, ε; k, b f , n); (iv) aggregate prices w, r, and m′; and (v) law of
motion for the aggregate states, such that: (i) the household’s policies satisfy Equations
2.13, 2.14, and 2.15 ; (ii) the firm’s policies are optimal; (iii) the firm’s V(z, ε; k, b f , n)
satisfies Bellman’s Equation 2.4; (iv) the w and r clear the labor and bond markets and
m′ = βUc′/Uc; and (v) the law of motion is consistent with the stochastic processes of z
and ε.
The equilibrium shares some of the same characterization as in Jermann and
Quadrini (2012). First, if τ > 0, the enforcement constraint binds in a steady
state. Second, with τ = 0 and κ = 0, changes in ε have no effect on firms’ labor
and investment decisions. Thus, when τ = 0 and κ = 0, business cycle fluctua-
tions are driven only by productivity. The model becomes a real business cycle
model, where firms are indifferent between debt and equity but still distinguish
between hours per worker and employment choices.26
26It is not difficult to prove the equilibrium characterization from Equation 2.10 and Equation
2.14, see Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
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2.4 Quantitative Analysis
The goal of this section is to evaluate the quantitative effects of the cyclical bene-
fit costs mechanism and the financial conditions. Their macroeconomic impacts
are captured by the responses of the model to estimated productivity and finan-
cial shocks. Results show that the cyclical benefit costs and financial conditions
are crucial not only for employment volatility but also for its recent slow recov-
eries. Yet, the finding does not mean that other economic factors and shocks are
not of significance to the U.S. employment dynamics.
2.4.1 Computation
I use numerical methods since the model cannot be solved analytically. I ap-
proximate the conditional expectations in Equations 2.4, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.14
nonlinearly, with piecewise-linear functions that interpolate linearly between
the grid points of a five-dimensional state space (z, ε, k, n, b). Starting with initial
guesses for the conditional expectations at each grid point, I can compute all
variables of interest by solving a system of nonlinear equations, with the Garcia
and Zangwill (1981) technique assuming that the enforcement constraint only
binds occasionally.27
At the same time, I make sure that the system of the nonlinear equations
at each grid point is truly solved by checking the reasons that the solving al-
gorithm terminates. Once I have solved the equation system for all the grid
points, I update the guesses for the conditional expectations through Gauss-
27With uncertainty, the constraint may not be always binding as in steady state, because the
firm could reduce its borrowing in anticipation of future shocks.
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Hermit Quadrature (z and ε are lognormal) and keep iterating until the changes
in all policy functions convergence at 0.001. There are 10 grid points in total for
each endogenous state of k, n and b, and 5 for each exogenous state of z and ε.28
2.4.2 Parameterization
The period in the model is a quarter from 1964Q1-2010Q4. Some parameters
can be calibrated using steady-state targets, several of which are typical in the
business cycle literature. The others, such as benefit cost function parameter
g, stochastic shocks, and dividend adjustment cost parameter κ, cannot be cali-
brated using such targets, since they do not matter in a steady state.
I set β = 0.9798, implying that the annual steady-state market interest rate
is 8.49 percent. Utility function parameter α = 1.2285 is chosen to have steady-
state per worker hours equal to 13 . Labor share in the production function is
set to θ = 0.7213. Within labor input, employment share a = 0.8428 and the
elasticity parameter of the substitution between the hours and the employment
is chosen to be γ = −2 so that steady-state employment is at 23 and the per worker
hours and the employment are complements (Konig and Pohlmeier, 1989). The
depreciation rate δ = 0.0250.
The tax wedge is set to τ = 0.3500, which is also used by Jermann and
Quadrini (2012). The mean value of the financial conditions ε = 0.1989 is cho-
sen to match a steady-state ratio of debt over quarterly GDP equal to about 4.
This is the average ratio during the period 1964Q1-2010Q4 for the nonfinancial
business sector based on the data from the Flow of Funds Accounts (for debt)
28Matlab R2012b and Fortran are used in the computation.
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and National Income and Product Accounts (for GDP). At the same time, the
steady-state ratio of capital stock over quarterly GDP equals to about 8 as in the
data average for 1964Q1-2010Q4 as well.
Next, I calibrate parameters φ and g, which are unique and important to this
model. It is clear that φ is the steady-state value of the benefit costs, or more
precisely, the steady-state value of the quasi-fixed employment costs. Table A.2
summarizes the possible range for the quasi-fixed employment costs as a per-
centage of total wages.29 The benefit cost data come from the same three sources
as in Figure A.7: NIPA, Chamber of Commerce, and BLS. NIPA gives the mini-
mum benefit cost share and BLS gives the highest for the pre-1990 and post-1990
periods in Table A.2. The average benefit cost shares are calculated as the av-
erage of all three sources. A more detailed description of the data sources is
provided in the Appendix.
The training cost estimate for the pre-1990 period comes from Oi (1962) and
Manning (2010, Table 2); and its post-1990 period estimate is from BLS (1995)
and Manning (2010, Table 2). According to Oi (1962) and Manning (2010, Table
2), in 1951 the hiring and training costs in the U.S. equal about 5.4-7.3 percent
of the wage cost, out of which 7 percent is directly used as the pre-1990 pe-
riod training cost share in my Table A.2. Manning (2010)’s Table 2 also reports
his training cost estimate from Barron, Berger and Black (1997), which is 34-156
percent of monthly pay for U.S. firms between 1980 and 1993. BLS’s Reports
on Employer-Provided Training for 1995 conclude that employees who work in
establishments with 50 or more workers received an average of 44.5 hours of
29Notice they are not calculated in terms of total compensation, since once I include other
quasi-fixed costs such as the training costs, it is more convenient to calculate the ratios in terms
of wages, as the total compensation becomes less clearly defined.
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training in the period May-October 1995.30 Accordingly, I calculate the train-
ing cost to be 9 percent of the total wages by dividing BLS 44.5 hours by two
quarters of hours worked, assuming 40 hours per week, and then multiplying
two, which is assumed to be the relative cost of trainers’ wage and trainees’ op-
portunity cost over wage. Therefore, in Table A.2 for the post-1990 period, the
minimum training cost share is my estimated 9 percent of the total wages from
BLS, the maximum is 156 percent according to Manning (2010), and the average
is calculated from all three numbers – 9 percent from BLS, and 34 percent and
156 percent from Manning (2010). The total quasi-fixed employment cost shares
are the sums of the benefit costs and the training cost.
From the costs shown in Table A.2, this paper uses two sets of them, the
average benefit costs and the maximum total, as the value of φ to put into the
model. For the pre-1990 period, I take φ as the average benefit costs, 26 per-
cent of total wages, and as the maximum quasi-fixed costs, 44 percent. For the
post-1990 period, the average benefit costs of 33 percent of total wages and the
maximum quasi-fixed costs of 194 percent are used for φ.31 The larger φ for the
post-1990 period reflects a higher steady-state benefit costs and hence a higher
sensitivity of the benefit costs to employment changes during the time. This, in
turn, will allow the benefit costs to affects the employment more significantly in
the post-1990 period than before.
In addition, it remains to estimate the endogenous relationship between the
cyclical components of employment growth and benefit costs to obtain the pa-
rameter value for g in the benefit cost function φ(n
′
n )
g. I take the log form of the
benefit cost function and make the following transformation:
30Accessed at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/sept.nws.htm on September 30th, 2012.
31DeLoach and Platania (2008) use 32.2 percent of total compensation, i.e., 47.5 percent of total
wages, as the steady-state value of health insurance cost.
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It is clear that the cyclical components of the benefit costs equal the cycli-
cal part of employment growth multiplied by g. Therefore, to estimate g, I de-
trend logged real per worker benefit costs by HP filter, and plot it against the
HP-filtered logged employment growth, then run a simple OLS to regress the
former on the latter. Figure A.8 presents a good idea of how the two are related.
First, the detrended benefit costs are strongly positively associated with the
detrended employment growth, as is the benefit function form I presumed ear-
lier. Second, the relationship between the two indeed has changed over the past
two decades. I estimate that before 1990 g = 0.7016 and after 1990 g = 1.3523.
The larger g for the post-1990 period indicates that the benefit costs are more
sensitive to the employment changes (consistent with Figure A.5) and in turn
affects the employment more effectively than it did before 1990. One caveat
is that since the benefit costs and the employment are endogenous, the OLS
used here may be subject to the problem of endogeneity. However, I regressed
the benefit costs on lagged employment growth, and the message remains the
same, that is, g increased for the period after 1990. In order to match the model
function form, I use the estimation results for g obtained from the original OLS
regressions in Figure A.8.
For the productivity z, I follow the standard Solow residuals approach and
compute the stochastic technology process using the log-linearized production
function. To construct the financial conditions ε, I follow a similar procedure but
use the enforcement constraint under the assumption that it is always binding,
that is, εt(kt+1 − bt+1Rt ) = yt. The linearized version of this constraint can be written
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as εˆt = φkkˆt+1+φbBˆrt+1+yˆt, where Brt+1 = bt+1Rt , φk = −ε ky , and φb = ε Bry .32 The hat sign
denotes percentage deviations from the deterministic trend, and the bar sign de-
notes the steady-state values. εˆt reflects firms’ capacity to issue debt from their
existing debt and output after deducting investment expenditure. Figure A.9
plots the financial conditions εt. The volatility of financial conditions does not
change much for the entire period; but there has been more enduring financial
tightening during the recovery periods following the post-1990 recessions.
After constructing the series of the productivity and the financial conditions,















where ez,t+1 and eε,t+1 are i.i.d. with standard deviations σz and σε, respectively.
At this point, it is only the dividend adjustment cost parameter κ that remains
to be calibrated. It is chosen so that the standard deviation of model-generated
equity-payout-to-output ratio is at least as large as that of the data over the
period 1964Q1-2010Q4 (0.1057). In practice, the different values of φ used in
this paper affect the standard deviation of model-generated equity-payout-to-
output ratio, I use κ = 5 to have the standard deviations fall into the desired
range according to the data.33 The full set of parameters is reported in Table
A.3.
32With steady-state targets, I determine the coefficients φk = −2.1128 and φb = 1.1128. I then
use the above equation to construct the time series with empirical measurements for the end-
of-period capital, ˆkt+1, the end-of-period liabilities, ˆBrt+1, and output yˆt, which can be easily
obtained through detrending the data.
33Notice that the standard deviation of model-generated equity-payout-to-output ratio is ac-




Figure A.10 plots the model results for the post-1990 period using gpost90 = 1.3523
and φpost90max = 0.4527, with cyclical employment data. To highlight the impor-
tance of the model mechanisms, the figure also reports the responses generated
by the standard model without benefit costs or financial conditions, which is
obtained by eliminating the dividend payout adjustment cost, the bond market
and the benefit costs from my model. Clockwise, the first three subplots graph
the results from my full model, from the model with the benefit costs but no
financial conditions (i.e., only productivity shocks, τ = 0, and κ = 0), and from
the model with the financial conditions but no benefit costs, while the fourth
subplot compares the results of all three model scenarios.34 A quick glimpse
of the plots tells us that both benefit costs and financial conditions have con-
tributed significantly to the delayed employment recoveries and employment
volatilities. The full model is able to generate a much closer match with the data
in terms of both dimensions of the employment dynamics, than the standard
model can.
From the subsequent subplot of Benefit Cost Only in Figure A.10, it is clear
that the benefit cost mechanism alone has contributed significantly to the de-
layed timing of employment recoveries. The model-generated employment
troughs for 2001 and 2007 recessions are in line with those of the data. This
is due to the larger benefit cost increases at the beginning of the recent recover-
ies during the post-1990 period. Yet, Figure A.10 also shows that the benefit cost
mechanism stimulates the employment volatility just as much as the standard
34In this section, to keep the terminology simple, I refer to the quasi-fixed employment costs
as the benefit costs too. But keep in mind, φmax actually represents the quasi-fixed employment
costs, and φave is the benefit costs.
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model can. In fact, the benefit costs alone (with productivity shocks) explain
49 percent of employment volatility, marginally larger than the standard model
can. To improve this, here comes the role of financial conditions.
Looking at the subplot of the results from the model with Financial Condi-
tions Only, I find that the financial conditions drive the volatility of employment.
However, they deliver too much fluctuations. This is because the large capital
stock as a share of output has made financial conditions matter considerably.
Hence, they deliver a big impact on employment. Moreover, the financial con-
ditions have contributed to the delays of employment recoveries as well. Recall
that there has been enduring financial tightening during the recovery periods
following the post-1990 recessions. But, the slowness of employment recoveries
caused by financial conditions themselves is not adequate without the benefit
cost mechanism, especially following 1990 and 2001 recessions.
Now, comparing the results from the above Three Model Scenarios, we can
clearly see that, benefit costs help smooth the employment volatility caused by
financial conditions and extend the slow recovery of employment. This is be-
cause the benefit cost mechanism prevents firms from adjusting employment
right away.35 Together the two mechanisms allow this simple model to gener-
ate a very close match with cyclical employment movement, lining up with the
cycle’s turning points and explaining 76 percent of its volatility.
More specifically, at a time when the business cycle is moving towards a
trough, financial constraint is tight, so employment is discouraged. At the same
time, the benefit costs are below their trend. Hence, the employment decreases
35In the full model, per worker hours volatility as well is smaller than that in the model with
financial conditions only, because hours and employment are complements in the model. Firms
actually resort to more dividend adjustment in the full model.
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but not right away as much as it would have without the relatively low benefit
costs. The opposite occurs near peaks. When the financial constraint is loose,
employment is encouraged; due to the above-trend benefit costs, however, the
employment does not increase immediately as much as it would have other-
wise.
Figure A.11 shows the same comparisons for the post-1990 period, except
that the model results are computed using the average φpost90ave = 0.0778. Now,
as the benefit costs are more moderate, their smoothing impact on employment
volatility becomes weaker. This is because firms do not have to wait for longer
time to make more dramatic employment changes. However, the contribution
of the benefit costs to the delayed cyclical employment recoveries remains in
Figure A.11, as well as the full model results.
To examine more closely the timing of aggregate employment recoveries (in-
cluding both the employment trend and its cyclical components), Figure A.12
plots the cumulative employment growth generated by the model, as in the
right panel of Figure A.1. Using the maximum φpost90max, the model is able to
generate 3-to-7-quarter delays of employment recoveries relative to output re-
coveries. In the data, the delays are 3-6 quarters. Particularly, following the
1990 recession, employment recovery delayed for 4 quarters in the data and 3
quarters in my model; for 2001, it was 6 quarters in the data and 7 quarters in
my model. The depth of employment declines has also been closely matched at
about 1 percent from NBER business cycle trough level. For the Great Recession,
the model generates deeper and longer employment drop than what is from the
data. Yet, in terms of both recovery timing and decline depth, this paper has
improved results comparing with those from Berger (2012), where the delays
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of employment recoveries are shorter at 3-4 quarters and the employment de-
clines are shallow for the Great Recession. Compared with Bachmann (2009)
where his model cannot explain the Great Recession, my model results match
well with it, and generate better employment decline and recovery for the 1990
recession too.
Using the average φ, the more moderate estimate of benefit costs, the results
with benefit cost mechanism alone are weakened. But they still generate job-
less recoveries during the Great Recession, as well as nearly zero employment
growth following the 1990 and 2001 recessions. With financial condition, the
model is able to deliver the delayed employment recovery of 3-8 quarters, as
well as deeper employment declines. Now we can conclude that the model re-
sults of jobless recoveries are not very sensitive to the calibration of φ. Overall,
from Figure A.12, it is clear that both benefit costs and financial conditions have
contributed to the delays, and that benefit costs smooth out and prolong the
sharp changes in employment due to financial conditions.
In order to scrutinize how much the cyclicality of benefit costs have con-
tributed to the slow employment growth, I also plot in Figure A.13 the results
from a model with fixed benefit costs only (without financial conditions). We
can see that fixed benefit costs cannot deliver jobless recoveries following the
1990 and 2007 recessions. In fact, there are two factors in the cyclicality that
drive the slow employment recoveries, which cannot be captured by the fixed
benefit costs. On the one hand, it is next period employment, n′, that firms
have to decide, with expectations about future. This embeds the idea that firms’
hiring and firing decisions are subject to uncertainties in the economic envi-
ronment. On the other hand, it is the increase of benefit costs (i.e., part of the
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marginal cost of employment) at the beginning of recoveries and its decrease
during recessions that have further deterred employment adjustments. Both
factors work for the employment impact of cyclical benefit costs to generate
better results than fixed benefit costs can.36
Furthermore, impulse responses to one-time productivity and financial
shocks are reported in Figure A.14 and Figure A.15, respectively. These results
are based on the model for the post-1990 calibration with φpost90max, but are sim-
ilar when using the other calibrated versions. From Figure A.14, we see that
a negative productivity shock, indeed, delivers a significantly delayed employ-
ment recovery relative to the output recovery. Figure A.15 shows that a financial
shock generates more volatility in employment and hours than a productivity
shock can in the same model. Under the financial shock, employment growth is
also slower than that of output.
Next, Figure A.16 plots the model-generated employment cycle using the
maximum gpre90 = 0.7016 and φpre90max = 0.1027 for the pre-1990 period. The
model using the average φpre90ave = 0.0607 generates almost the same results, as
can be seen from Table A.5, column (2) and (3). For the sake of simplicity, only
the plot with results using φpre90max is reported here. Because of the lower φ and
smaller g estimated for the per-1990 period, i.e., a weaker relationship between
the benefit costs and the employment growth, the benefit cost mechanism be-
comes much less efficacious regarding the delay in employment movement at
this time. Financial conditions also have less impact since tight financial con-
ditions did not continue into recessions during the pre-1990 period. It enables
36Between the two factors, n′ has a larger effect. However, it is not because that, in the model
formulation, firms deliberately decide next period employment. After all, it is only one-quarter
delay by deliberation, but the model generates up to 7-quarter delays of employment recoveries.
The key lies in firms’ employment decisions under uncertainty.
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the same model of mine to successfully generate no delay in the employment
recoveries as in the data for the pre-1990 period. This can also be seen from Fig-
ure A.12: the pre-1990 results of employment recoveries have at most 1 quar-
ter delay, as in the data. Moreover, benefit costs again help push employment
movement due to financial conditions closer to the data. However, the model-
generated employment volatility is neither as high as that of the data nor much
different from that of the standard model.
Table A.4 and Table A.5 report the specific standard deviations of the data
and the model results for output, employment, and per worker hours, respec-
tively. My full model is able to explain more than 76 (using φpost90ave or φpost90max)
percent of post-1990 employment volatility in the data. However, the model
does not do as well for pre-1990 employment volatility, where I can explain
about 50 percent of the data fluctuation. In fact, the pre-1990 period experienced
lower dividend payout volatility with a standard deviation of 0.0729, versus
0.1219 in the post-1990 period, and a larger capital-to-output ratio, which could
have increased my model-generated pre-1990 employment volatility if I had
distinguished the pre-1990 and post-1990 calibration targets for the dividend
adjustment cost parameter κ and the steady state of capital-to-output ratio. But
in order to focus on the changes brought by the benefit costs, I differentiate the
values of only those parameters that are related to the benefit costs, i.e., φ and
g. Additionally, output volatility has been matched well for the two periods.
However, the fluctuation of per worker hours is larger than that of the data
and that of employment in several cases, which needs correction in near future,
potentially with the inclusion of overtime wage.
Last, it is important to investigate the model-generated employment recov-
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ery delays against not only the NBER business cycle troughs, as I did previously,
but also the output and per worker hours produced by the model. Figure A.17
shows that indeed the model is able to deliver the lagging relationship between
the model-generated output and employment for post-1990 recoveries.37 Using
either maximum φ or average φ does not alter the lagging relationship. Figure
A.18 is attempting to convey the same message for the lagging relationship be-
tween the model-generated per worker hours and employment. However, it is
less clear from the current results.
2.5 Conclusion
Are flexible hours, financial conditions, rising benefit costs and the cyclicality of
those costs important for recent employment dynamics in the U.S.? The anal-
ysis of this paper suggests that they are. I propose a simple DSGE model that
explicitly incorporates these factors, in which they each play an important role
in generating business cycle labor market movements.
Using firms’ financial conditions and dynamic employment benefit costs, I
show that they are crucial for capturing not only the recent slow employment
recoveries but also employment volatility. In particular, with the benefit costs
alone, my model can deliver 1-to-6-quarter delays relative to NBER business
cycle troughs for the employment recoveries after the 1990, 2001, and 2007 re-
cessions. It can also generate about 49 percent of the volatility in the post-1990
employment data. Moreover, together with the financial conditions, the im-
pacts of the two mechanisms enable my model to explain more than 76 percent
37Notice the difference between results here and those shown in Figure A.12. Figure A.12 uses
the growth rates calculated from employment level with trend, not HP-filtered.
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of the employment volatility in the data for the post-1990 period, a much higher
percentage than that of existing literature. Also, they together generate 3-to-7-
quarter delays of employment recoveries relative to NBER troughs during the
post-1990 period, while generating no delay before that. This is consistent with
the data that has scarcely been matched in the literature. My results match well
with the cyclical movement of output too.
Having shown the significant employment impact of financial conditions
and benefit costs, this paper does not intend to interpret the results such that
they are the only drivers of the recent jobless recoveries and, as noted earlier,
there are many other contributing factors. The main unique point of this pa-
per is that they do have important effects on the tradeoff that firms face be-
tween adjusting hours per worker and employment, hence affecting employ-
ment volatilities and recovery timing. Also, this paper raises some important
policy concerns that are related to firms’ financial conditions and employment-
based benefit systems and health insurance costs. On one hand, favorable finan-
cial conditions are crucial for timely employment recoveries; curtailing the fi-
nancial condition’s procyclical movement can significantly reduce employment
fluctuations. On the other hand, although it is difficult to judge various op-
tions without a welfare analysis, according my results it is clear that the cyclical
quasi-fixed employment costs delay employment recoveries and the costs’ ris-
ing trend deepens employment declines. At the very least, it would be helpful
to employment to reduce benefit costs and mitigate their cyclicality for private
firms, especially to prevent them from rising at the beginning of a recovery.
Furthermore, potential extensions based on my model can be made to evaluate
various benefit system options and their impact on employment and welfare.
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Several aspects of the current paper could be improved. First, the formula-
tion of the benefit costs constrains the model’s ability to match well with the
volatility of the benefit costs’ cyclical components in the data (0.0006 in the
model, 0.0106 in data), although the directions of the fluctuations around the
benefit costs’ trend are consistent with the data. With a higher volatility of ben-
efit costs, this model has potential to generate larger employment fluctuations.
Hence, in this sense the paper’s current results understate the employment im-
pact of benefit costs. Incorporating heterogeneous workers (part-time, full-time;
skilled, unskilled) in the model may be able to improve this dimension. Second,
this model performs better for the post-1990 period than for the pre-1990 period
in terms of the employment volatility, which could be improved by switching to
period-tailored calibration targets for dividend volatility and capital-to-output
ratio steady states.
Third, this model produces procyclical wages, whereas in the data the ag-
gregate wages are acyclical or even counter-cyclical. Yet, it is shown that real
wages in the microdata are indeed procyclical, but their procyclicality is merely
obscured in the aggregate time series because of a composition bias: the aggre-
gate statistics are constructed in such a way that gives more weight to low-skill
workers during expansions than during recessions (Prasad and Keane, 1993;
Solon, Barsky, and Parker, 1994; and Prasad, 1996). Therefore, an extension of
my simple model can incorporate heterogeneously skilled workers to address
this issue. Fourth, this paper has not considered overtime wages and the trade-
off between the overtime wages and the employment benefit costs. It would
be helpful for generating better per worker hours38. Last, I plan to incorporate
38An alternative to better per worker hours results is to use a general Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function F(z, k, n, h f ) = zkθ1nθ2h
θ3
f , so that hours per worker become a substitute to employ-
ment.
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the benefit cost and financial condition mechanisms into a DSGE search model.
This will enable the model to examine more dimensions of the labor market.
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CHAPTER 3
TAXATION AND LEVERAGE IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
3.1 Introduction
In most countries, firms can deduct interest expenses from their corporate tax
base, but not equity returns. This causes a tax advantage of debt finance, the
so-called debt bias of taxation. In the public finance literature, this debt bias
has been intensively explored (see, e.g., Auerbach, 2002). More recently, the
excessive leverage induced by corporate taxation has regained policy interest in
the wake of the financial crisis. Indeed, while taxes are unlikely to have caused
the crisis, the high indebtedness encouraged by the debt bias of taxation might
have made firms more vulnerable to the negative shock and could well have
deepened the crisis.1
A large number of studies have empirically estimated the relevance of the
debt bias of taxation and report significant results (recently, e.g., Graham, 2003;
De Mooij, 2011; Feld, Heckemeyer, and Overesch, 2011). Yet, there are almost
no studies on debt bias in the banking sector. Indeed, studies on debt bias ei-
ther eliminate data on financial firms or make no distinction between financial
and non-financial companies. Conversely, studies on bank capital structures
typically ignore taxation. Only in a recent paper, Keen and De Mooij (2012) an-
alyze debt bias in banks. They point to two special features of banks that can
1This chapter is coauthored with Ruud de Mooij and Tigran Poghosyan at International Mon-
etary Fund. An earlier version is published as IMF Working Paper No. 12/281. Disclaimer:
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views ex-
pressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those
of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are
published to elicit comments and to further debate.
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make debt bias different as compared to non-financial firms. First, banks face
capital requirements that restrict their debt ratio choice. Second, banks face dif-
ferent agency costs due to regulation (such as deposit insurance) and implicit
or explicit state insurance (e.g., due to too-big-to fail status). Using unconsoli-
dated statements of over 14,000 commercial banks in 82 countries, they find that
the sensitivity of banks’ debt to taxation is very similar to that of non-financial
firms. This outcome is important in light of the significant externalities associ-
ated with excessive bank leverage. Indeed, high bank leverage tends to increase
the probability of a bank’s default and, if the bank is systemic, contributes to the
probability of a financial crisis. Although Keen and De Mooij (2012) do not look
specifically at multinational banks, they do explore whether large banks (which
are systemically the most important) differ from small banks and find that the
former’s leverage are notably less responsive to tax changes.
A relatively new strand of the debt bias literature looks into the behavior
of multinational firms. Specific for them is the opportunity of international
debt shifting. By the traditional debt bias channel described earlier, a firm or
a subsidiary’s leverage is affected by local tax levels. In contrast, international
debt shifting entails a multinational choosing the financial structure of its sub-
sidiaries in different countries partly on the basis of tax differences. At a high-
tax location, debt finance is attractive because the interest costs can be deducted
at a higher rate. In a low-tax location, equity finance is more attractive since
the returns will be taxed at a lower rate with the repatriated dividends usu-
ally exempt for the parent. Thus, a tax-minimizing strategy of a multinational
will involve relatively more debt in high-tax jurisdictions. Studies for the U.S.
by Hines and Hubbard (1990), Collins and Shackelford (1992), Grubert (1998),
Altshuler and Grubert (2002), Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), and Mills and
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Newberry (2004) all find that subsidiary debt ratios respond to international
tax differences in the expected way. For European countries, Moore and Ruane
(2005), Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008), Bttner and Wamser (2009), and
Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg, and Winner (2010) report similar results. This is an
important message since international debt shifting erodes corporate tax bases
in high-tax countries. Several high-tax countries have therefore taken measures
to prevent base erosion, e.g., by restricting interest deductibility (see, e.g., Bttner,
Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser, 2008).
This paper combines the two strands of literature by exploring debt bias of
taxation in multinational banks. Our analysis aims to shed light on how these
banks respond to corporate taxation, through the traditional debt bias channel
and international debt shifting. This paper’s approach is closely related to that
in Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008), who explore debt bias in multina-
tional firms. However, their study excludes banks and is confined to European
firms.2 The debt bias analysis of multinational banks in this paper is partic-
ularly important for at least two reasons. First, multinational banks are often
systemically important, not only within a country but also across countries. Ex-
ploring their leverage response to taxation is therefore critical to better under-
stand the causes and consequences of financial crises and the role of taxation
therein. Second, it is important to understand the nature and size of interna-
tional debt spillovers of tax policy through the banking sector. Indeed, such
spillovers raise several policy concerns regarding tax competition, policies to
address debt shifting, and interactions with bank regulation, including through
2Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Martinez Peria (2007) argue that the structures of multinational
firms and banks are somewhat different. Unlike multinational firms, internationally active
banks tend to operate through two types of affiliates: subsidiaries or branches. They show that
local corporate taxes affect the mode of bank entry, with branches being a more preferred entry
mode in countries that have higher tax rates. We do not consider branches in this empirical
analysis and focus on taxation and leverage of subsidiaries.
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capital requirements.
Using a novel data set for 558 commercial bank subsidiaries of the 86 largest
multinational banks in the world, we find that corporate taxes matter signif-
icantly through both the traditional debt bias channel and international debt
shifting. While the tax effects are statistically significant and large, the interna-
tional debt shifting channel appears to be more robust and tends to be larger
than the traditional debt bias. These results imply that taxation causes signif-
icant international debt spillovers through multinational banks, which has po-
tentially important implications for tax policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out a
simple theory to guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical
methodology and data, while Section 4 discusses the estimation results. Section
5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Model
This section develops a model for the optimal capital structure of a multina-
tional bank (or parent bank). The model follows the standard trade-off theory,
in which each bank subsidiary entails a convex cost of debt finance that is asso-
ciated with possible capital requirement violation and bankruptcy, and entails a
tax advantage of debt finance, since the interest is deductible for corporate tax-
able profits while equity returns are not. This tax advantage, through the tradi-
tional debt bias channel, leads to a higher leverage of the subsidiaries, which is
traded off against the law violation and bankruptcy cost. In addition, the parent
bank rebalances the capital structure among its subsidiaries, depending on the
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relative tax rates of the host countries where the subsidiaries operate. In par-
ticular, it will have an incentive to finance subsidiaries in high-tax countries by
(intra-company) debt since the interest paid is deductible against a high rate.
Subsidiaries in low-tax countries will be more likely financed by equity since
returns on equity are taxed in the host country and are typically exempt when
repatriated to the parent. Meanwhile, the parent bank also faces its own capital
requirement violation and bankruptcy cost that is associated with the leverage
of the whole group.
The model predicts that the optimal debt-to-assets ratio of a subsidiary bank
of a multinational will be positively related to the host country tax rate, as well
as to the international tax difference between the host-country tax rate and the
tax rates prevailing at other subsidiaries. As a subsidiary bank faces tighter
capital requirements, the possible legal violation makes it costlier to increase
leverage, resulting in a less sensitivity of the bank to tax changes.
The model is based on Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2010), with corporate
income tax (CIT) bias, but is also substantially different from theirs, in that our
model features a multinational bank setup and includes the convex cost of pos-
sible capital requirement violation and bankruptcy. It considers a multinational
bank operating in m countries. The multinational has one subsidiary bank3 in
each host country i with total assets Ai assumed to be given. The subsidiary
bank provides loans Li yielding an interest rate li, and borrows Bi (including
deposits and other debts) at interest rate r. The profit function for a subsidiary
bank i is therefore given by:
3The model does not distinguish between subsidiaries and branches. We assume that the
parent bank provides explicit or implicit credit guarantees for the debts of its subsidiaries. If
there are multiple subsidiary banks in a country, we consider them as being one subsidiary. In
the estimations, however, we allow multiple subsidiary banks of the same parent in one host
country.
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Pi = liLi − rBi (3.1)
which is also the CIT base of the subsidiary bank.
Subsidiary bank i owns fixed assets, denoted by FAi. Together with the out-
standing loans, this forms the asset side of the balance sheet. On the liability
side, Ei stands for the subsidiary bank’s total equity. Hence, the balance sheet
constraint of the subsidiary bank is given by:
Ai = Li + FAi = Bi + Ei. (3.2)
As in Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2010), we assume that the subsidiary bank
is partly owned by the parent bank and partly by outside investors. Denotes
ki the proportion of the subsidiary bank owned by the outside investors, we
assume the required net rate of return by them to be equal to the return on
alternative investment options (n):
kiPi(1 − ti)
Ei − FAi − 1 = n. (3.3)
The capital structure of both the parent (p) and its subsidiaries (i) are re-
stricted by legal minimum capital requirements (rE), which are set by the coun-
try in which the bank operates:
Ei ≥ rEiLi, Ep ≥ rEpLp. (3.4)
The minimum capital requirement in Eq. 3.4 might be violated by either the
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subsidiary or the parent, at a certain legal cost. In addition, both the parent
bank and its subsidiaries are at the risk of bankruptcy given their debt. We
assume that the parent bank provides implicit credit guarantees for the possible
bankruptcy and legal penalty in case of violating the capital requirements by its
subsidiaries. Therefore, the parent bank takes account of not only the leverage
of the multinational group as a whole, but also the leverage in its subsidiaries.
The overall cost of debt finance, caused by both the possible bankruptcy and
the possible violation of the capital requirement faced by the parent bank and




where Ci is the cost of subsidiary bank i and Cp the cost of the parent bank.
Similar to Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008), the cost of the subsidiary
is defined as Ci =
mi(rEi)Aib2i
2 , where bi = Bi/Ai denotes the subsidiary’s leverage ra-
tio, in which the cost is convex, for the multinational recognizes that higher
leverage increases the chance of bankruptcy. But different from their paper, the
convexity here changes with capital requirement tightness, since mi(rEi) is not
a parameter but a positive and increasing function of the capital requirement
faced by the subsidiary. All else equal, when the subsidiary faces a tighter cap-
ital requirement, it has a higher chance of violating the law, both the cost level
Ci and the marginal cost of increasing leverage rise. Hence, the subsidiary’s
cost increases with its leverage and capital requirement, whose interaction also
affects each other’s impact on the cost.










where gp(rEp) is a positive and increasing function in the capital requirement
faced by the parent bank. The group’s total assets are denoted by Ap =
∑m
i=1 Ai,
and the group’s total leverage is the sum of all the subsidiaries’ debts over




. Likewise, the parent’s cost increases with the
group’s overall leverage and its capital requirement. Conveniently, we further







The multinational bank chooses Ei, Li and Bi so as to maximize its overall
post-tax profits, i.e., the sum of post-tax profits of all its subsidiaries minus the








subject to constraints 3.1-3.3, and 3.5. Substituting those into the maximiza-




(1 − ti)(Li[li − 1 + n1 − ti ] − Bi[r −
1 + n











From the first-order condition of Bi (see Technical Appendix for derivation
details), we find:
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bi = λ0i + λ1iti + λ2i
m∑
j,i
(ti − t j)q j + λ3i
m∑
j,i
[b j(m j(rE j) − mi(rEi))]q j (3.9)










Eq. 3.9 shows that the leverage of a subsidiary bank depends on two tax-
related terms. First, the term λ1iti reflects the debt impact of local tax level at
the subsidiary’s host country. This quantifies the traditional debt bias channel.
The coefficient λ1i turns out positive here, indicating that a higher local CIT rate
will increase bank leverage. Second, the term λ2i
∑m
j,i(ti − t j)q j reflects the debt
impact of international tax differences. The coefficient λ2i is also predicted to be
positive in our theory, suggesting that as the CIT rate in the host country be-
comes relatively high compared to CIT rates in other host countries of the same
multinational bank, the subsidiary bank’s leverage rises. Thus, it measures the
international debt shifting. Important for our empirical analysis is that in the
second term the international tax differences (ti − t j) are weighted by the asset
shares of subsidiaries in all the other host countries, q j.
The tax effects captured by the coefficients λ1i and λ2i in Eq. 3.9 depend
on the capital requirements faced by both the parent bank and its subsidiaries.
In particular, when the capital requirement becomes tighter, i.e., rEi and rEp
get larger, the violation cost at the margin of holding debt rises. The higher
marginal cost (benefit) of raising (lowering) leverage makes the bank less sen-
sitive to tax changes. In the regressions, we will test whether this hypothesis is
indeed valid.
The theory also offers some insights on the relative magnitudes of λ1i and λ2i,
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which measure the importance of the traditional debt bias channel as compared
to the international debt shifting. In particular, if gp(rEp) > mi(rEi), then λ1i < λ2i,
in this case, international tax difference exerts a larger effect on leverage than
local tax, that is, the international debt shifting is a more important channel
than the traditional debt bias. Intuitively, when the violation cost is larger for
the parent bank, gp(rEp), than for subsidiary bank, mi(rEi), then the parent bank
will find it relatively easy to shift debt across subsidiary banks, but costlier to
modify the overall leverage level of the group, hence, the international debt
shifting is dominating. However, if debt finance would be less costly for the
multinational bank as a whole compared to for subsidiary banks, e.g., because
unlike the parent bank, the subsidiaries do not enjoy the same protection against
bank failure, then the opposite would hold. In the next section, we will explore
these hypotheses empirically.
Summing up, the main predictions of the model are as follows:
1) Bank leverage depends positively on the local CIT level.
2) Bank leverage depends positively on the weighted average difference be-
tween the subsidiary host country’s CIT rate and those of the other subsidiary
host countries for the same maturational group. The weights are subsidiaries’
asset shares.
3) The impact of traditional debt bias channel might be either smaller or
larger than the impact of international debt shifting, depending on the capital
requirement violation cost to the subsidiary versus to the parent bank.
4) As a host country’s capital requirement becomes tighter, ceteris paribus,
its bank leverage becomes less sensitive to the changes of both local tax and its
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tax difference with other host countries.
3.3 Empirical methodology and data
3.3.1 Methodology
The strategy is to estimate a series of panel regressions of the general form:
leverageikt = α + λ1taxit + λ2itdit + βσikt + δγit + µi + εikt (3.10)
where leverageikt is total-liability-to-total-assets ratio for subsidiary bank k
at host country i in year t, taxit is the statutory CIT rate the subsidiary bank
faces, itdit is a variable measuring international tax difference (see below for
details),σikt is a vector of subsidiary-level controls, γit is a vector of host-country-
level controls, and µi is host country fixed effect. Our attention focuses on the
coefficients λ1 and λ2, which reflect the marginal impacts of the traditional debt
bias channel and of the international debt shifting. In particular, the theory
predicts that λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0. Also, the tax elasticity of leverage is expected to
be larger if a subsidiary bank holds more capital beyond its capital requirement
(i.e., in the theory, λ1 and λ2 become larger as relevant capital requirements are
loosened).
The measurement of international tax difference, itdit, is the asset-weighted
average of differences between the tax rate of subsidiary k in country i and those
of other subsidiaries within the same parent bank, as in Huizinga, Laeven, and
Nicodeme (2008). More specifically, it is computed as
∑m
j,i(taxit − tax jt)q jt, where
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the parent bank has a total of m subsidiary banks, and weights q jt reflect the
subsidiary asset shares in the total assets of the multinational group, i.e., q jt =
A jt∑m
j=1 A jt
. A positive value of this tax difference variable indicates that, on average,
there is an incentive to shift debt into the subsidiary host country i; a negative
value indicates the opposite.
To understand the calculation of the international tax difference variable,
let us illustrate it with an example. Suppose there is a corporate group that
consists of three (m = 3) subsidiaries in country A, B, and C, respectively, each
having one third of the group’s total assets. The international tax difference
for the subsidiary in country A, itdA, is then calculated as the asset-weighted
differences between the tax rate in A, τA, and the tax rates in B and C, τB and τC,
respectively: itdA =
∑m
j=A(τA − τ j)q j = (τA − τB)13 + (τA − τC)13 . If τA is 10 percent,
and both τB and τC are 20 percent, then itdA equals about -7 percent. As the
subsidiary is located in a relatively-low-tax country A, there exists an incentive
to decrease leverage. If τA increases to 50 percent, itdA would rise to 20 percent,
indicating that the subsidiary is located in a relatively-high-tax country and has
an incentive to increase leverage.
The asset size of a subsidiary matters for the debt shifting incentive. Sup-
pose the asset size of the subsidiary in country A increases to one half of the
group’s assets, while the subsidiaries in B and C are still of equal size (i.e. now
1
4 of the group’s assets). We assume that τA is 50 percent, while τB and τC are
still 20 percent. The international tax difference for the subsidiary in country A
now is: itdA = (τA − τB) 14 + (τA − τC) 14 = 15 percent, instead of 20 percent in the
previous example, implying a smaller incentive to shifting in debt. More gener-
ally, the larger a subsidiary’s asset share is within the multinational, the smaller
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the leverage impact of a tax change through international debt shifting will be.
Intuitively, large subsidiaries have more capacities in absorbing debts without
increasing much of their leverage. Additionally, the smaller the assets held by
other subsidiary banks abroad (other than in country A), the smaller the scope
for debt to be shifting from them to A. Therefore, the international debt shift-
ing channel is positively proportional to the asset share of subsidiaries in other
countries, but negatively proportional to the asset share in the subsidiary’s re-
siding country. Likewise, international debt shifting effect is expected to be
larger for the leverage of a subsidiary with a relatively small asset size.
Furthermore, we can rewrite the international tax difference as:
∑m
j,i(taxit −
tax jt)q jt = taxit − ∑mi=1 taxitqit. The rearranged equation reflects the tax difference
between the subsidiary and the asset-weighted average tax rate of the group as
a whole (or, the average tax faced by the parent bank). Since it contains the local
tax level variable taxi, already captured by the second term on the right-hand
side of Eq. 3.10, we can redefine itdit =
∑m
i=1 taxitqit, then the newly estimated
λ′1 = λ1 + λ2 and λ
′
2 = −λ2. In the empirical exercise, we also use alternative
weights in the measurement of the international tax difference, such as liability
weights and time-invariant asset weights (i.e., the average of the subsidiary-
asset-weights across time) to eliminate a possible endogeneity problem arising
from endogenous assets with leverage.
The bank-level controls in σikt are those usually included in the capital struc-
ture literature (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009). First,
we include the book value of a subsidiary bank’s assets and its square to allow
for non-linear size effect. This scaling variable reflects that larger banks have
easier access to credit because they tend to be more diversified and less prone
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to bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Moreover, large banks could benefit
from a too-big-to-fail notion (e.g., De Haan and Poghosyan, 2011). Thus, we
expect a positive relation between subsidiary bank size and its leverage.
Second, we include the pre-tax return on assets as a measurement of prof-
itability. Theory suggests that its effect on leverage is ambiguous. On the one
hand, profitable banks could be perceived to be less risky and face less financial
distress, which would facilitate their access to external credit. Moreover, prof-
itable banks could have more incentive to reduce tax payment by raising debt
than loss-making banks that benefit less from tax deductibility. This would sug-
gest a positive relation between profitability and leverage. On the other hand,
higher profits add to equity if retained within the firm, directly reducing the
leverage ratio, suggesting a negative relation between profitability and lever-
age. This is also consistent with the ”pecking order” theory developed by Myers
and Majluf (1984), according to which in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion firms prioritize internal financing to the issuance of new debt.
Third, growing banks invest more, holding profitability constant, and could
accumulate more debt over time. However, growth also decreases financial dis-
tress and places a greater value on the equity holder, thereby encouraging equity
investment and reducing leverage. Overall, its effect on leverage is ambiguous.
In terms of the measurement of bank growth, market-to-book-asset ratio is the
most commonly used proxy. But since not all subsidiary banks in our sample
are listed, we use the growth of total book assets.
Fourth, collateral can reduce costs of issuing both debt and equity. In empir-
ical studies on the capital structure of non-banks, it is typical to find that collat-
eral increases access to external funding so that firms can rely less on retained
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earnings. Thus, the leverage ratio tends to rise with collateral value. However,
the very nature of the banking sector and the impact of regulation could change
this for banks. We use the proportion of total security assets and non-earning
assets out of total assets as a proxy for collateral.
Finally, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that non-debt tax shields are a
substitute for the tax benefits of debt financing. Hence, they should be neg-
atively related to leverage. We measure non-debt tax shields by total-non-
interest-expenses-to total-assets ratio.
We also control for subsidiary host country characteristics. First, we include
GDP growth and inflation. High growth at the country level is expected to
facilitate debt finance. An inflationary environment could lead to higher risk
premiums and discourage debt supply. Yet, as nominal interest is deductible
for the CIT, high inflation could also encourage debt demand as it lowers real
borrowing costs. The overall impact of inflation on leverage is ambiguous. Sec-
ond, if a country provides generous deposit insurance, depositors could be more
willing to place their funds in banks without having to monitor their activities.
We include a 0/1 dummy for the existence of deposit insurance and expect its
debt impact to be positive. Third, we include the minimum capital require-
ment, which should have a negative impact on bank leverage. Finally, we add a
financial crisis dummy from Laeven and Valencia (2010). A crisis could initially




Data of the subsidiaries of 100 largest multinational banks in the world are col-
lected from Bankscope database, compiled by Bureau Van Dijk.4 The database
provides accounting data on banks around the world, including information
about ownership relations. This latter information allows us to match the sub-
sidiaries with their multinational parents.5 In our analysis, we focus on com-
mercial banks and we do not consider branches. We define a bank as a sub-
sidiary if more than 50 percent of it is owned by a parent bank. If a subsidiary
bank owns its own subsidiaries, then the data we use can be from either con-
solidated or unconsolidated statements, whichever is available in the database.
The consolidated statement reflects the activities of the subsidiary bank itself
and all the subsidiaries it owns. The unconsolidated statement, in contrast, re-
flects only the accounts of the subsidiary bank itself. In our sample, 36 percent
of the subsidiaries report consolidated accounts and 64 percent report uncon-
solidated statements.
Table B.1 shows detailed information about variable constructions and data
sources. Starting from the raw data, we first drop all inactive subsidiary banks.
We also drop subsidiary banks with a leverage ratio larger than 99 percent,
or with a pre-tax profit-to-asset ratios smaller than -20 percent or larger than
250 percent, or with negative total non-interest expenses, or with non-earning-
4In our regressions, we use only data of subsidiaries, not those of their parents. This is be-
cause we want to look at how multinational banks place leverages across their subsidiaries due
to host countries’ taxes, adding parent banks may complicate the results. Also, our partial equi-
librium model does not include a parent bank either, so the empirical exercises are consistent
with the theory.
5The data we have from Bankscope do not report historical ownership. Therefore, our anal-
ysis is based on the latest ownership information, implicitly assuming that ownership has not
changed for banks in our sample. A robustness check based on the data for last two years yields
qualitatively similar results on the debt impact of taxes, providing indirect support to our re-
sults.
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assets-to-total-assets ratio larger than 99 percent, or with total assets growth
larger than 150 percent, or with effective tax rates smaller than zero, or with
missing total assets or CIT rates. Doing so, we end up with a sample of 558
commercial bank subsidiaries (both domestic and foreign), owned by 86 largest
multinational commercial banks in the world. The parents are headquartered
in 25 countries, while their subsidiaries are located in 66 different host coun-
tries. The sample spans through 1998-2011 period. Table B.2 provides summary
statistics of main variables of interest, such as leverage, statutory CIT rates, in-
ternational tax differences, and control variables. Table B.3 displays the correla-
tions between variables. Figure B.1 shows the distribution of bank leverage in
the sample.
Table B.4 presents information on the number of parent banks and sub-
sidiaries (both domestic and foreign) in different countries. We see that many
parent banks reside in France, Germany, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. A rel-
atively large number of subsidiaries are hosted in France, Luxemburg, Russia,
the U.K., and the U.S. Table B.5 provides information on average financial lever-
age and CIT rates in subsidiary countries. The average financial leverage ranges
from 69.3 percent in Argentina to 94.9 percent in Spain. CIT rates are the high-
est in Japan and the lowest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international tax
difference variable suggests that subsidiaries in Germany, Thailand, and Zam-
bia should have the largest debt levels in light of their relatively high tax, while




Table B.6 reports our baseline results, where we regress subsidiary bank lever-
age on tax variables and bank-level variables, first without and then with
country-level variables. Tables B.6-B.10 show various robustness checks, using
alternative estimators, samples, and specifications. Finally, Table B.11 partitions
observations by capital tightness of the subsidiary banks.
3.4.1 Baseline Regressions
Results in Table B.6 are based on OLS regressions with subsidiary host coun-
try fixed effects. For each variable we indicate between brackets the predicted
sign of the coefficient. Regression (1) contains local tax level and bank-level
variables, excluding international tax difference variable and host country con-
trols. We see that the local tax coefficient is close to 0.3 and statistically signif-
icant. It supports hypothesis (1), namely that a higher tax in the host country
increases the debt ratio of its residing subsidiaries. The coefficient of 0.3 means
that an increase in the statutory CIT rate by 10 percentage points will increase
subsidiaries’ leverage ratio by 3 percentage points (= 0.3 10). The size of the
effect is close to the coefficient of 0.26 found for non-financial firms in Huizinga,
Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008), and in the analysis of De Mooij (2011). It is also
very similar to the coefficient of 0.27 for banks found by Keen and De Mooij
(2012). This evidence supports the traditional debt bias channel.
Bank-level control variables are also important. Table B.6 confirms that
larger banks have higher leverage ratios. Higher profitability reduces the lever-
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age ratio. While theory is ambiguous about the impact of bank growth on lever-
age, our estimations suggest that faster growing banks accumulate more debt.
The collateral variable has a negative coefficient, again consistent with that for
non-financial firms in Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008). Even though
collateral is generally expected to have a positive effect on financial leverage, it
can also make equity issuance less costly with lower asymmetric information
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995). For our sample, this positive impact on equity ap-
pears to be dominant. Finally, non-debt tax shields substitute for the tax benefits
of debt financing and reduce leverage, as suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980).
Regression (2) adds international tax difference variable. We see that the
estimated coefficient for this variable is statistically significant and positive. It
supports the theory that subsidiary bank leverage is affected by the interna-
tional tax differences with multinational banks, consistent with our hypothesis
(2). Note that the local CIT rate level enters both in the first and in the second
term in the regression. The first term, whose effect is measured by coefficient λ1,
captures the effect of local taxation on the leverage of banks through traditional
debt bias channel. We see that this effect is smaller than in the first regression,
because part of the impact is now captured by the second term. With a coeffi-
cient of 0.25, however, the traditional debt bias channel remains important. The
second term, whose impact is measured by coefficient λ2, captures the interna-
tional tax difference effect on leverage. Its value of 0.12 suggests that this second
effect appears smaller than the first channel in this specification.
Regressions (3) and (4) augment regressions (1) and (2) with an additional
set of host-country controls. The GDP growth variable enters the regressions
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positively, as expected. However, all the other host country controls are not sta-
tistically significant, except that in column (4) the financial crisis variable enters
with a weakly significant negative coefficient. The estimated coefficient for the
CIT rate in regression (3) is very similar to that in column (1), although slightly
smaller in size. It again confirms hypothesis (1).
In regression (4) the estimated coefficient for the local CIT is reduced to 0.16,
much smaller than in column (2). The coefficient for the international tax dif-
ference is positive and significant, consistent with hypothesis (2). Compared to
column (2) the coefficient is much larger at 0.18. Comparing the two tax chan-
nels in column (4), we find that the international tax difference is slightly more
important than the traditional debt bias channel. This would be consistent with
the case in which the capital requirement violation cost for the multinational
group is larger than that for a single subsidiary. However, the difference be-
tween the two channels’ importance is not statistically significant, with the F-
test of coefficient equality p-value of 0.69. Hence, column (4) suggests that the
traditional debt bias channel and the international debt shifting are both rele-
vant in explaining the impact of the CIT rates on the leverage ratio of subsidiary
banks.
To illustrate the findings in columns (3) and (4) further, we use an example of
a hypothetical U.S. multinational bank. On average, in our sample a U.S. multi-
national bank has about 10 subsidiaries around the world. Suppose that our
hypothetical U.S. parent bank owns 10 subsidiaries with equal asset size. We
consider a tax cut by 10 percentage points in country A where one of the sub-
sidiaries resides, while keeping the tax rates in all other countries unchanged. In
this case, there are two channels through which the leverage ratio of subsidiary
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banks in country A can be affected. One is the traditional debt bias channel,
due to the change of tax level; the other is the international debt shifting chan-
nel, due to the change of relative tax differences. When we use the results in
regression (3), the two effects are combined and measured by the coefficient of
the CIT rate level. The 10 percent CIT rate reduction in country A will reduce
the leverage ratio of its subsidiaries by 2.5 percent. When we use regression (4)
results, the two channels are distinguished. Through the traditional debt bias
channel, the leverage ratio drops by 1.59 percentage points. Through the in-
ternational debt shifting channel, the leverage ratio declines by 1.62 percentage
points (= 0.18 × 10 × 0.9). The overall impact is then 3.21 percentage points (=
1.59 + 1.62).
Suppose now instead, the statutory CIT rate declines by 10 percentage points
in all the other countries, except for country A. In regression (3), there is no
effect on leverage, since foreign tax rates are not included in the regression and
international debt shifting effect cannot be captured. In regression (4), however,
the international tax difference rises by 9 percent (= 0.9 × 10). This increases the
leverage ratio of the subsidiary banks in country A by 1.62 percentage points (9×
0.18). Hence, international debt spillovers associated with relative tax changes
can only be quantified by regression (4).
Overall, the results in Table B.6 suggest significant and sizeable effects of
taxation on bank leverage. If we look at the size of the subsidiary banks in
the data, the mean value of total assets is USD 2.8 billion while the median is
USD 2.1 billion. This is larger than the banks analyzed in Keen and De Mooij
(2012). In their data, only 5 percent of the banks exceed an assets size of USD 1.2
billion. While Keen and De Mooij (2012) find very small tax responses for their
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5 percent group of largest banks, our sample containing relatively large banks
reports considerably larger effects. In column (4), we see that a considerable part
of the tax effect originates from international debt shifting. Hence, our results
suggest that large subsidiary banks are as responsive as the average banks are
found in Keen and De Mooij (2012), but that the impact on debt is for more than
half explained by international debt shifting.
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
Tables B.7-B.10 present robustness checks, taking regression (4) in Table B.6 as
our benchmark specification. In Table B.7, regressions (5)-(7) correct standard
errors by clustering observations across parent banks, host countries, and sub-
sidiaries, respectively. The estimated coefficients for the two tax variables are
unchanged by the clustering, but standard errors increase. Nevertheless, the
tax coefficients remain statistically significant at either the 1 percent or 5 percent
level. Regression (8) uses the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which
are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the error structures up
to a certain lag (or where errors are correlated between groups). Again, the
traditional debt bias remains statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but
the international debt shifting loses significance slightly, now significant at 10
percent.
In Table B.8, regressions (9)-(11) adopt alternative measurements for the in-
ternational tax difference variable. Given that the construction of international
tax difference variable includes an element of local tax rate, it is positively cor-
related with the local tax variable (with a correlation coefficient of 0.68 in Table
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B.3). In regression (9) we exclude the local tax rate from the second term in our
specification. Thus, the coefficient for the CIT rate captures the overall impact of
a change in local taxation on subsidiary leverage, both through the traditional
debt bias channel and international debt shifting. The coefficient for the inter-
national tax difference captures only the impact of a change in foreign tax rates,
reflecting international debt shifting channel. As expected, regression (9) shows
that (i) the coefficient for the CIT rate is now larger (reflecting both channels),
and (ii) the foreign tax has a negative coefficient: higher foreign taxes in other
host countries reduce the leverage of subsidiaries in this country. In fact, the co-
efficients of this regression are directly linked to those in regression (4), in that
λ′1 = λ1 + λ2 and λ
′
2 = −λ2 , as predicted in Section 3.1.
Regression (10) eliminates the time variation in asset weights by using con-
stant asset weights in the calculation of the asset-weighted international tax dif-
ference. The constant asset weights are calculated as the average of the asset
weights across time for each subsidiary bank. This can help to reduce potential
endogeneity issues arising from endogenous assets with leverage.6 The coeffi-
cients remain significant in this regression for our two core tax variables. In fact,
the international debt shifting effect becomes larger, while the traditional debt
bias channel becomes weaker. In column (11), we use leverage shares rather
than asset shares to compute the weights for international tax difference vari-
able. The results are very similar to those in column (4) of Table B.6.
Next, regression (12) takes short-term debt ratio as the dependent variable
rather than total leverage. Short-term debt is calculated as total leverage minus
6We also ran regressions for a dynamic specification using the system GMM estimator as in
Keen and De Mooij (2012). The instruments should help to reduce possible endogeneity. How-
ever, the results turned out to be very sensitive to the choice of instruments and are therefore
not reported.
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long-term funding ratio. While both tax variables enter again with a positive co-
efficient, the local tax coefficient is larger than before, implying that long-term
debt (such as customer saving deposits) is less responsive to tax than short-term
liabilities. Interestingly, regression (12) also shows that the deposit insurance
variable reduces short-term debt. Considering that the variable has an insignif-
icant effect for total leverage, our result suggests that deposit insurance exerts
a positive effect on long-term funding. This is intuitively appealing as the debt
covered by deposit insurance tends to be of a long-term nature.
In Table B.9, regression (13) employs quantile regression instead of OLS to
address the possible impact of the skewed distribution of bank leverage. Quan-
tile regressions approximate the conditional median instead of the mean of a
dependent variable, which reduces the impact of outliers. Thus, its estimates
should be more robust, if the response measurements are highly skewed. Fig-
ure B.1 shows that the distribution of bank leverage in our sample is indeed
highly skewed to the right. Therefore, quantile regressions should be helpful
in our case. Regression (13) suggests that using quantile regressions the two
tax effects remain statistically significant, as before, but their magnitudes be-
come smaller. Since quantile regressions give less weight to sample outliers, the
result suggests that for our outliers, i.e., subsidiary banks with very low debt-
to-asset ratios, their leverage could be more affected by taxes. This is consistent
with our later results in Section 4.3, where we find that the leverage of banks
with more abundant capital is more affected by tax changes. Regression (14) in
Table B.9 contains a host-country-specific trend variable that captures the de-
clining trend of statutory CIT rates worldwide. Now we see that the traditional
debt bias channel becomes statistically insignificant, and the international debt
shifting effect remains significant and large.
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Table B.10 exploits the regression specification as in (4) but for various sub-
samples. In regression (15) we restrict the sample to subsidiaries for which we
have data from unconsolidated statements. This reduces the number of observa-
tions from 3905 to 2569. The results for core tax variables are the same, although
the impact of the international debt shifting is larger than before. Regression
(16) considers only subsidiary banks with positive profits. We expect taxes to
have a larger effect for profitable banks, since the value of interest deductions is
smaller for loss-making banks (as costs can only be used against future profits,
if at all). The coefficients for λ1 and λ2 are indeed larger than the ones in the
baseline estimation, consistent with our expectation.
Furthermore, regression (17) limits the sample to subsidiaries residing in ad-
vanced countries. The advanced countries are defined as countries where the
domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a share of GDP is higher
than the sample average. We expect the international debt shifting channel to
be more pronounced for these countries where banks use more sophisticated
products that could facilitate capital transfers globally. Indeed, relative to the
benchmark regression, the value of international tax difference coefficient, λ2 ,
is much larger in magnitude at 0.47 than in the benchmark (0.18). However, we
find no significant effect of the traditional debt bias channel. Note that regres-
sion (17) also reports a positive impact of inflation on leverage and a negative
impact of capital requirements.7 Finally, regression (18) confines the sample to
the period before the latest global recession by excluding observations between
2009 and 2011. The tax effects are similar to the baseline estimates, with a larger
7For deposit insurance there is weakly significant negative coefficient. This contrasts with
our expectations. However, it might be that in the absence of deposit insurance governments
in advanced countries offer implicit insurance to banks, e.g., through the expectation of public
bail out at times of distress. Hence, the presence of explicit deposit insurance could actually
imply lower insurance through other implicit channels, consistent with the finding of Gropp
and Vesala (2001).
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coefficient for the international debt shifting. We also see that inflation is nega-
tively associated with bank leverage.
3.4.3 Extension: Capital Tightness
In Section 2, our theory shows that banks that are regulated under tight capi-
tal requirement are less responsive to tax. Intuitively, capital-tight banks, i.e.,
those that hold capital close to the requirement level, will be more constrained
in adjusting leverage ratios due to the cost of violating capital requirement. The
conjecture is therefore that banks’ responsiveness to tax declines with their cap-
ital ratio relative to the minimum capital requirement they face.
To test this hypothesis, we calculate capital tightness as follows. For each
subsidiary bank we compute its capital ratio relative to the legal capital re-
quirement prevailing in its residing host country. We then divide subsidiary
banks into three equal-sized groups: banks with most abundant capital relative
to their capital requirements, an intermediate group, and a group of banks with
the tightest capital. We run regressions for the first and last groups, respectively.
Table B.11 presents the results. Comparing columns (19) and (20) we find
that taxes exert a larger impact on the leverages of the capital-abundant banks
through both the traditional debt bias channel (with its coefficient equal 0.28)
and the international debt shifting (with its coefficient equal 0.35). For capital-
tight banks, however, the coefficients are much smaller at 0.05 and -0.02, re-
spectively, whereby the latter is statistically insignificant. Hence, when the host
country’s capital requirement becomes tighter, we expect banks to become less
sensitive to tax changes. This is consistent with our theoretical hypothesis (4)
66
and also with the findings in Keen and De Mooij (2012).
3.5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the sensitivity of multinational bank capital structures to
taxation. Using a sample of 558 commercial bank subsidiaries of 86 largest
multinational banks in the world over 1998-2011 period, we find that a bank’s
leverage depends on corporate income taxes in two ways: (i) the traditional
form of the debt bias channel, measured by the debt impact of the local tax level
in the host country of a subsidiary; and (ii) international debt shifting, mea-
sured by the debt impact of the international tax difference vis-a-vis other bank
subsidiaries in the same multinational parent bank. While the tax effects are sta-
tistically significant and large, the international debt shifting effect appears to
be more robust and is often larger in our empirical studies than the traditional
debt bias channel. It implies that tax policies around the world induce signifi-
cant international debt spillovers through their impacts on multinational bank
behavior.
The results raise a number of policy concerns. First, international debt
spillovers could intensify the incentives for tax competition by governments,
which could lead to inefficient policies. From this perspective our results
strengthen the case for international tax coordination. Second, countries could
seek measures to remedy international debt shifting, such as, by imposing thin
capitalization rules that restrict the deductibility of interest on intra-company
loans. These measures, however, generally do not apply to banks and raise
the issue of specific bank regulation and bank taxation. More fundamentally,
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countries could consider eliminating debt bias altogether by neutralizing the
tax treatment of debt and equity, e.g., by introducing an allowance for corporate
equity?as Belgium, Italy, and Latvia have done. In principle, such an allowance
could be applied specifically to the banking sector alone. Finally, capital require-
ments can play a role for the impact of taxation. The results in this study, for in-
stance, suggest that banks become less responsive to tax changes if their equity
is closer to the minimal capital requirement. The interaction of bank taxation




A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES: SOVEREIGN DEFAULT, EXCHANGE
RATES, AND TRADE
4.1 Introduction
Establishing a theoretical link between sovereign default and international trade
is important, not only because the empirical literature has often noted that trade
is affected by sovereign default through mechanisms upon which economists
still lack consensus, but also because in return default occurrences can be influ-
enced by trade ties too (Rose, 2005). In principle, the reduction in trade follow-
ing a debt default could come from restrictive measures imposed by the country
of residence of the investors. This is the assumption often made by the theoret-
ical debt literature. However, there is little historical record of countries impos-
ing quotas or embargoes on a country that falls into default (Tomz, 2007). In
addition, Borensztein and Panizza (2008) show in their empirical analysis that
despite trade and trade credit are negatively affected by default as in Kaletsky
(1985), controlling for trade credit does not modify the effect of default on trade.
This paper argues that a currency crisis (or drastic exchange rate depre-
ciation) frequently coincides with default1, and it is a major reason for trade
changes. In default, the country’s terms of trade deteriorates, which means that
more domestic production is diverted towards exports in exchange for the same
amount of imports. My model captures the following feature of the external sec-
tor in default: rising exports and declining imports so that households of default
1Reinhart (2010) shows most time inflation crises company defaults; Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011) finds that in merging markets the correlation of the share of countries with inflation and
currency crises is about 75 percent during 1950-2009.
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country consume less. Moreover, if a sovereign government internalizes its cit-
izens’ desire for imported goods, averting the currency depreciation caused by
default motivates the country to keep its debt service on time. Hence, interna-
tional trade ties matter to sovereign default.
Additionally, this paper finds that currency depreciation during default peri-
ods is also the main cause for output loss upon default. As shown in Figure C.1,
during Iceland’s default in 2007, at most one third of the post-default output
loss actually comes from reduced production activities. This is also true for the
default episodes in the Philippines, Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, and so on.
For some of the default countries, GDP volume actually had positive growth.
Only because of exchange change depreciations, their output value declined
(e.g., Brazil).
However, quantitative models typically treat sovereign default in isolation
of a currency crises or other crises. In those models, default triggers restrictions
to access to international credit and an output loss. While the assumption of
post-default restricted access to international credit is reasonable, it is unclear
in those models the output loss is due to currency depreciation or decreased
production volume. Those models do not incorporate exchange rates. In this
spirit, I introduce a two-open-economy model with exchange rate and interna-
tional goods trade, in which default does not affect domestic production volume
but national income and relative price making imported goods more expensive.
This paper sets out to make three main contributions. First, new insights
into how sovereign defaulters are punished are proposed in this paper, that
is through exchange rate depreciation. This is particularly important because
there is no codified rule for dealing with defaulters. It is ambiguous in the lit-
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erature that trade sanctions and reputation penalty could explain default occur-
rence and post-default phenomena. However, frequently currency crises and
inflation accompany sovereign defaults due to capital flight. The resulting ex-
change rate and trade changes can be significant sources of penalty to default-
ers in a connected world. Second and subsequently, through the analysis of
post-default exchange rate changes, we can understand how a countrys pref-
erences for imports and foreign demand for its exports affect its propensity to
default. Past research suggests that less outward-oriented sovereigns might be
more willing to default. By changing the relative preference for imported goods,
researchers can begin to consider how a country revolt with a reduced desire for
foreign goods might spur default.
Third, empirical evidence has pointed to the trade impacts of sovereign de-
faults, but little has been done theoretically, especially with explicit export and
import preferences and welfare analysis of two countries. This paper intends
to make some progress along this dimension. I develop a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model of two open economies trading goods and
capital with each other with endogenous default risk. The model helps us to
gain insights about the relationship between international capital and goods
flows in an incomplete market.
I find that upon occurrence of default, defaulting country suffers from neg-
ative exchange rate shocks, its domestic goods consumption drops slightly and
imports (i.e. creditor country’s exports) decline more drastically due to wors-
ened terms of trade. Creditor country’s domestic goods consumption also drops
slightly and imports (i.e. defaulting country’s exports) increase, but overall the
creditor country’s welfare decreases.
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This paper proceeds first by reviewing the literature briefly, then examining
the empirical data on exchange rates and goods trade, and lastly presenting a
two-open-economy model and examining the implications of its results.
4.1.1 Literature
This study starts off from earlier work on sovereign default in a small economy.
At its root, the model follows the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and
Arellano (2008), in which a borrowing country’s income can only be buffered
by defaultable bonds. However, this paper differs from the aforementioned in
three aspects. First, taking away income in default is motivated by empirical
findings that output value often falls upon default. In previous works the typ-
ical default penalty is a simple output loss without distinguishing volume loss
or value loss.2 In my model, terms of trade deteriorate upon default, reducing
defaulter’s total income (i.e. output value not volume) and import purchasing
power at the same time. This is consistent with data.
Second, I study how default may affect international goods trade through
the exchange rate channel, as well as the creditor’s welfare. Previous models
have no explicit role for the international flow of goods; because there is no de-
mand for international goods, only international borrowing, financial autarky
only hurts the defaulter, leaves no harm on the creditor, which is not the case in
reality.
2In Arellano (2008), default is punished by losing a fixed percentage of output up to a thresh-
old.
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4.1.2 Patterns of Exchange Rates in Default
In Popov and Wiczer (2009) Table 1, the authors present the gross changes over
a year for default countries’ nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and real
effective exchange rate (REER). They show that countries in default suffer a con-
sistent depreciation of around 10 percent, no matter it is NEER or REER. They
also find that even at high frequency, the depreciation is abrupt upon default. In
Figure C.2, I use REER dynamics in Iceland as an example. According to Rein-
hart (2010), Iceland defaulted from 2007-2010, and at that time they have been
having a free floating exchange rate regime. Upon default, its REER depreciated
significantly for about 30 percent.
There could be multiple reasons for the coinciding currency depreciation.
For instance, foreign capital may flee when a country defaults, causing depre-
ciation. My model does not include how exchange rate depreciation happens
following a default, but takes it as an exogenous shock. The focus of this paper
is to study the trade impact of default via this exchange rate channel, as well as
a country’s default incentive given the trade tie.
4.1.3 Patterns of Trade in Default
Sovereign default also brings adjustments to trade, in terms of both volume and
a percentage of GDP. Rose (2005) documents that defaults reduce real bilateral
trade value by 8 percent for an extended period after the event. However, it
does not take into account exchange rate fluctuations. I show in Figure C.3 that
the export and import status in Iceland after defaults. A clear pattern emerges:
export volume rise and import volume decline (at least during the first year of
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default). This can be related to exchange rate changes from last subsection. Due
to the post-default currency depreciation, domestic households substitute away
from imports; whereas foreign households find defaulting country’s exports be-
come cheaper than before, thus exports increase. Moreover, when looking at
trade values, Figure C.3 shows that both exports and imports decline, so now
we know the decrease in exports is due to exchange rate depreciation.
4.2 Model
My model characterizes the equilibrium outcome of trading interactions be-
tween two risk-averse countries. It starts off from Arellano (2008), but extends
the commodity space to domestic and foreign goods and two countries. Con-
sider a world with two open economies with endowments: a natural lender and
a natural borrower. Each country can produce only one type of goods, so there
exist two types of goods in the model. Consumers in each country enjoy both
types of goods, they trade what they can produce for the goods they can’t make.
Specifically, country 1 is endowed with goods 1, country 2 goods 2. These goods
are imperfect substitutes with constant elasticity.
Non-contingent debt denominated in good 1 is traded. The borrower coun-
try 2 could default on its debt repayment obligations to country 1. Lender coun-
try 1 is larger than country 2, and is considered to be safe and may borrow
occasionally but never defaults.3 The bond contracts reflect default probabili-
ties that are endogenous to the borrower’s incentives to default and its funda-
mental. Hence, the equilibrium interest rate that the borrower faces is linked
3If differences in size are large, then country 1 may never have an incentive to default.
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to its default risk. Default can happen along the equilibrium because the as-
set structure is incomplete, as it includes only bonds that pay a non-contingent
face value. With non-contingent assets, the risk-averse lender country is will-
ing to offer debt contracts that in some states may result in default by charg-
ing a higher interest rate on these loans. Default entails an output cost due to
currency depreciation (rather than volume decrease) and temporary exclusion
from the international financial markets, but there is no punishment otherwise
(i.e. no sanction on international goods trade).
Ci stands for country i’s total consumption index. ci j stands for country i’s
consumption of good j. e j stands for total endowment of good j. p j stands for
good j’s price, and let p1 = 1. bi stands for country i’s assets. Both governments
internalize their citizens’ preferences over domestic goods and imports. α is
risk aversion parameter. I also assume that each country’s consumers purchase
relatively larger share of their own goods, i.e., home bias; in calibration θ1 > 0.5
and θ2 < 0.5.
U(Ci) =
C1−αi
1 − α (4.1)
Country 1:
C1 = [θ1(c11)ρ + (1 − θ1)(c12)ρ] 1ρ (4.2)
Country 2:
C2 = [θ2(c21)ρ + (1 − θ2)(c22)ρ] 1ρ (4.3)
Since only country 2 has the possibility of defaulting, it is particularly impor-
tant to examine its default decision. Country 2 compares its value of repaying
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debt and that of default and chooses the option that gives a bigger value:
V2x(s, b2) = max {V2c(s, b2),V2d(s)} (4.4)
where V2c is country 2’s optimized value under open financial market as
below:
V2c(s, b2) = max
b′2,c21,c22
{





p2e2 + b2 = c21 + p2c22 + qb′2. (4.6)
However, in the event of default, both countries go into financial autarky,
that is, no bond is traded within a certain period of time. It is only with prob-
ability re that they start trading bonds again. Their goods trade continues re-
gardless of the financial autarky. However, the defaulting country’s currency
will be forced to depreciate by a certain percent from its zero-bond level in each
income state, i.e., p2d = p2(s, 0) ∗ (1 − loss). One can think of this as capital flight
out of the country, hence the depreciation is exogenous to this current model.
With this exchange rate depreciation imposed, only goods 1 market can not be
cleared between the two countries. Creditor country 1 will have to save or ex-




{U(c21, c22) + βE[reV2x(s′, 0) + (1 − re)V2d(s′)]} (4.7)
subject to
p2de2 = c21 + p2dc22. (4.8)
Hence, country 2 compares the value of repaying debt V2c and that of default
V2d to choose the better value. I define the default set D is a collection of states
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and debt levels when country 2 will strategically choose to default to maximize
its own value:
D(s, b2) = {s ∈ S : V2c(s, b2) < V2d(s)} (4.9)
Because no one knows which state the world is going to be in tomorrow
but state transition probabilities, default probability is the sum of all the prob-






In the other half of the world, with open financial markets, country 1 maxi-
mizes its own value, taking into account country 2’s possibilities of repayment
or default, subject to its budget constraint:
V1c(s, b1) = max
b′1,c11,c12











e1 + b1 = c11 + p2c12 + qb′1. (4.12)
where
















{U(c11, c12) + βE[reV1x(s′, 0) + (1 − re)V1d(s′)]} (4.14)
where V1x = [V1c(s, b1) or V1d(s)|country 2 defaults or not].
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Finally, both goods and financial (if not in financial autarky) markets clear at
the end:
e j(s) = c1 j + c2 j, j = 1, 2. (4.15)
b1′(s, b1) + b2′(s, b2) = 0. (4.16)
Definition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of functions for
(i) borrowing and lending government-households’ consumption policy c and savings
policy b′; (ii) the two governments’ value V at default and repayment; and (iii) law of
motion for the aggregate states, such that: (i) the borrowing and lending government-
households’ policies satisfy the problem’s first order conditions; (ii) the two govern-
ments’ V satisfies Bellman’s Equations; (iii) the p2 and q clear the goods and bond
markets during nondefault periods; and (v) the law of motion is consistent with the
stochastic processes of e2.
4.3 Computation and Calibration
This paper applies a nonlinear approach and solves the optimization prob-
lems for the two countries as functions of a two-dimensional state vector (s, b)
through collocation representations. For now, I use 5 grid points for state vari-
able b = b1 = −b2 and 3 states for s (3 endowment states for borrower country
2). Starting with initial guesses for b′, two countries’ consumptions, term of
trade and default risk, I compute all variables of interest by solving a system
of nonlinear equations. New values for b′, two countries’ consumptions, term
of trade, default risk, value functions are produced, updated and iterated until
collocation coefficients convergence to changes smaller than 0.001. This prob-
lem’s computational difficulty lies in the strong nonlinearity of both countries’
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policy functions given possible defaults, as well as calculating default probabil-
ities. Table C.1 gives the parameter values I use in the current exercise. Note
that the two countries are of different size: lender country 1 has a slightly larger
economy.
4.4 Quantitative Results
This section analyzes results for the calibrated model. Figure C.4 shows the sav-
ings function and bond price schedule faced by the potential default country
(country 2) in the model for two income shocks that are 5 percent above and be-
low trend, respectively. The left panel of Figure C.4 presents the savings policy
function b′(b, e2) conditional on not defaulting as a function of assets b for a high
and a low income shock. Savings b′ and assets b are reported as a percentage
of mean output. As borrowing becomes larger, country 2 can borrows more in
high income state than in low income state. This is consistent with the results
from Arellano (2008).
The right panel of Figure C.4 plots the price schedule, which determines
the set of contracts q(b′2(b2, e2), e2), b
′
2 that the borrower can choose from every
period. Bond prices are an increasing function of assets, making larger levels
of debt carry higher interest rates. Importantly, higher income is associated
with more generous financial contracts, as the interest rate charged for every
loan size is lower. More interestingly, since country 2 has default possibility
while country 1 does not, the latter’s financial contract is much more lenient
than the former’s. That is, country 2’s bond price becomes significantly lower
than country 1’s as each of their borrowing increases.
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Figure C.5 plots default country’s exchange rate and model generated inter-
national trade. Upon default, country 2’s exchange rate depreciates, by 10 per-
cent from the calculated currency value at zero borrowing or assets for each in-
come state. Its export volume slight increases, while imports volume decreases
more drastically. This is consistent with what we see in the data. Figure C.6 re-
ports trade value and it as a percentage of GDP. Both export and import values
decline after default, because of decreased imports and exchange rate despite of
risen exports. This is consistent with the data. But as a percentage of GDP, the
rise of imports is not as in the data. I also notice that high income state comes
with higher trade-to-GDP ratio, this is in line with the results earlier that high
income state comes with higher trade volume. Last but not least, in this model,
the more a country exports the less it has to save.
The default also affects creditor country 1, whose welfare function is plotted
in Figure C.7 with respect to its own asset level b1. We can see that as country 1
accumulates asset, at first the welfare goes up for no default has happened yet,
but then goes down upon the other country’s default.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper models the trade impact of endogenous default in a stochastic dy-
namic framework of two open economies that features incomplete markets and
currency crisis. In the model, exchange rate collapses due to default, therefore
affecting trade. It predicts post-default deteriorating imports and rising exports,
which is consistent with the data. It also can be used to study creditor coun-
try’s welfare, which can be affected by default at the meantime. This is the first
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paper incorporating both international incomplete capital markets and interna-
tional goods markets in a two-risk-averse-economy setting. Next steps in this
research program include exploring quantitatively the predictions of the model
in explaining the real dynamics observed during past defaults.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Data Sources
Employment: Total private, all employees, quarterly averages, seasonally
adjusted. From Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics
Survey (National) (CES). 1964Q1-2012Q3.
Per worker hours: Total private, average weekly hours, produc-
tion/nonsupervisory employees, quarterly averages, seasonally adjusted. From
BLS CES. 1964Q1-2012Q3.
Hourly wage: Total private, average hourly earnings of produc-
tion/nonsupervisory employees, 1982-84 dollars. From BLS CES. 1964Q1-
2012Q2.
Consumption and investment: Chained 2005 dollars, seasonally adjusted.
From Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Ac-
counts (NIPA) Table 1.1.6. 1964Q1-2012Q2.
GDP: seasonally adjusted at annual rates. From BEA NIPA Table 1.3.5.
1964Q1-2012Q2.
Price index: 2005=100, seasonally adjusted. From BEA NIPA Table 1.3.4.
1964Q1-2012Q2.
End-of-period debt stock (bt+1/Rt): Initial debt stock (1951Q4, from
LA144104005.Q) + Nonfinancial business; credit market instruments; liability
(LA144104005.Q) + its net increase (FA144104005.Q). From Federal Reserve Sys-
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tem, Flow of Funds Accounts. 1964Q1-2012Q2.
Dividends: Farm business; net dividends paid (FA136121073.Q) + Nonfi-
nancial corporate business; net dividends paid (FA106121075.Q) - Nonfinancial
noncorporate business; proprietors’ equity in noncorporate business (net worth)
(FA112090205.Q) - Nonfinancial corporate business; corporate equities; liabil-
ity (FA103164103.Q). From Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts.
1964Q1-2012Q2.
Capital stock: Initial capital stock (1951Q4, from NIPA Table 5.7.5A + NIPA
Table 6.1) + Nonfinancial business; total capital expenditures (FA145050005.Q) -
Nonfinancial business; consumption of fixed capital, equipment, software, and
structures, current cost basis (FA146300005.Q). From NIPA, and Federal Reserve
System, Flow of Funds Accounts. 1964Q1-2012Q2.
Federal funds effective rate: Quarterly. From Federal Reserve System, data
series H15/H15/RIFSPFF N.M. 1964Q1-2012Q2.
Bond yield: Bank of America Merrill Lynch US Corporate Master Effective
Yield, daily. Available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/BAMLC0A0CMEY.txt.
Together with the Federal funds effect rate, I estimate the annual bond interest
rate to be about 8.49 percent. December 31st 1996-October 9th 2012.
Overtime: Manufacturing, average weekly overtime, production/nonsupervisory
employees, quarterly averages, seasonally adjusted. From BLS CES. 1964Q1-
2012Q2.
Benefit costs: (1) NIPA Table 7.8 Supplements to Wages and Salaries 1929-
2011, total benefit costs per year; (2) Chamber of Commerce Employee Benefits
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Study 1963-2007, per worker benefit costs per year; (3) BLS Employer Costs for
Employee Compensation (ECEC) 1986-2011, per hour benefit costs, all workers,
private industry, annual data; (4) BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI) 1980Q1-
2012Q2, per hour benefit costs. All series are converted to per worker benefit
costs by the author with the BLS employment and per worker hours data.
Training cost: (1) Oi (1962), with the 1951 study by the In-
ternational Harvester Company, (2) Manning (2010) Table 2, and (3)
BLS 1995 Survey of Employer Provided Training (Employee Results) at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/sept.nws.htm.
Credit market tightness: The measures of credit market tightness used
to construct panels in Figure A.3 are from Federal Reserve Board and CEIC
database. In particular, the left panel data are from the Net Percentage of Do-
mestic Respondents Tightening Standards for Commercial and Industrial Loans
for Small and Large Firms obtained from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Sur-
vey on Bank Lending Practices from the Federal Reserve Board. The right panel
data are from CEIC’s data series 57229201, U.S. Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted
Nonfinancial Business Corporate Debt Flow, and data series 211484102, U.S.
Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted Nominal GDP.
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Figure A.1: Cumulative Employment Growth since Each NBER Business
Cycle
Peak (Left) and Trough (Right)
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA),
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics Survey (National) (CES), and
author’s calculations.
Takeaway: Left: employment dropped more deeply in the last recession and recovered more
slowly following all of the post-1990 recessions, than the pre-1990 period. Right: employment
recovered 3-6 quarters later relative to output recoveries during the post-1990 period, different
from before.
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Figure A.2: Left: Cumulative Employment Growth since Per Worker
Hours Troughs
and Right: Average Weekly Overtime (1964Q1-2012Q2, Quarterly)
Source: Left panel: NIPA, CES, and author’s calculations. Right panel: BLS, NIPA, and author’s
calculations.
Takeaway: Left: employment recovered 1-5 quarters later relative to per worker hours recov-
eries following all of the post-1990 recessions. Right: average weekly overtime has trended up
since 1990, implying a changed tradeoff between employment and hours.
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Figure A.3: Financial Conditions (Seasonally Adjusted)
Source: Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices from the Federal Re-
serve Board, and CEIC.
Takeaway: (1) Top panel shows credit supply, which tightens during recessions and gradually
loosens in recent recoveries. (2) The bottom panel depicts for longer period de-facto procyclical
credit conditions through debt flows as a percentage of GDP, which have recovered relatively
slowly after 1990 and 2001 recessions.
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Figure A.4: Left: Real Per Worker Benefit Costs (1964-2011, Annual)
and Right: Real Employment Cost Index (Private Sectors, 1980Q1-2012Q2,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted)
Source: Left panel: NIPA Table 7.8 Supplements to Wages and Salaries 1929-2011, Chamber of
Commerce Employee Benefits Study 1963-2007, BLS Employer Costs for Employee Compensa-
tion (ECEC) 1986-2011, and author’s calculations. Right panel: BLS Employment Cost Index
(ECI) and author’s calculations.
Note: Left panel: Real per worker benefit cost series are calculated by the author using NIPA,
Chamber of Commerce, and BLS data, respectively, deflated by the NIPA GDP price index, and
then averaged over the three series. NIPA’s wage and salary data is used in producing per
worker benefit costs as a percentage of total compensation. Right panel: Real employment in-
dex is deflated by NIPA GDP price index.
Takeaway: Left: benefit costs have been trending up. Right: benefit costs have been growing
faster than wage has.
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Figure A.5: Employment Changes and Real Per Worker Benefit Costs
(1964Q1-2012Q2, Seasonally Adjusted, HP-filtered)
Source: NIPA, CES, BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI), and author’s calculations.
Note: Benefits data starts from 1980Q1. N is employment while N′ is next period employment.
Throughout this paper, Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter uses a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Takeaway: (1) Benefit costs have cyclical components; they increase at the beginning of recover-
ies and decrease during recessions. (2) The cyclical components of benefit costs and employment
growth are positively correlated. (3) Their correlation has changed since 1990, that is, given the
same percentage increase of the benefit costs above their trend, employment growth has become
smaller.
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Table A.1: Employment-Based Benefits as a Percentage of Total Compen-
sation
(Private Industries, in Percent, 2012)
Legal required payments 8.3
Social security 4.7
Medicare 1.2
Workers’ compensation (for work related illness) 1.5
Unemployment insurance∗ 0.9
Retirement 3.6
Employment costs based on benefit formulas (defined benefit plans)∗ 1.5
Employer costs proportional to earnings (defined contribution plans) 2.1
Insurance (medical, life)∗ 8.2
Paid vacations, holidays, sick and personal leave∗ 6.8
Others 2.9
Total 29.8
Source: BLS, “Employer Costs for Employee Compensation - December 11, 2012,” Table 5,
news release USDL-12-2404.
Note: Items with a superscript asterisk are considered purely quasi-fixed, about 60 percent of
total benefit costs (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012).
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Figure A.6: Cumulative Output Growth since Each NBER Business Cycle
Peak
Source: NIPA, BLS CES and author’s calculations.
Takeaway: Only following the Great Recession, output has recovered much more slowly than
the pre-1990 period; the 1990 and 2001 output recoveries were just as fast. But all post-1990 re-
cessions were followed by slower employment recoveries than before. This implies that output-
employment relationship has changed since then.
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Figure A.7: Per Worker Benefits as a Percentage of Total Compensation
(1964-2011, Annual)
Source: NIPA Table 7.8 Supplements to Wages and Salaries 1929-2011, Chamber of Commerce
Employee Benefits Study 1963-2007, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Employer Costs for Em-
ployee Compensation (ECEC) 1986-2011, and author’s calculations.
Note: Real per worker benefit cost series are calculated by the author using NIPA, Chamber of
Commerce, and BLS data, respectively, deflated by the NIPA GDP price index, and then aver-
aged over the three series. NIPA’s wage and salary data is used in producing per worker benefit
costs as a percentage of total compensation.
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Table A.2: Quasi-fixed Employment Costs as a Percentage of Total Wages
φ/(wh)
Pre-1990 Post-1990
Min Ave. Max Min Ave. Max
Benefits 16 26 37 22 33 38
Training 7 7 7 9 66 156
Total 23 33 44 31 99 194
Source: Oi (1962) with the 1951 study by the International Harvester Company; Man-
ning (2010) Table 2; BLS 1995 Survey of Employer Provided Training (Employee Results) at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/sept.nws.htm; and author’s calculations.
Note: See the Parameterization section for the calculation details. The average benefits and the
maximum total for the pre-1990 and the post-1990 periods are the values used in the model
simulations.
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Figure A.8: Scatter Plots of HP-filtered Log Benefit Costs
and HP-filtered Log Employment Growth
Source: NIPA, CES, BLS ECI, and author’s calculations.
Note: N is employment while N′ is next period employment.
Takeaway: The relationship between the cyclical components of benefit costs and employment
growth indeed has changed since 1990, that is, given the same percentage increase of the benefit
costs above their trend, employment growth has become smaller, i.e., g becomes larger.
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Figure A.9: Financial Conditions εt
(1964Q1-2010Q4, HP-filtered)
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: See the Parameterization section for the calculation details.




Discount factor β = 0.9798
Utility parameter α = 1.2285∗
Labor share θ = 0.7213
Employment share a = 0.8428∗
Elasticity of substitution parameter γ = −2
Depreciation rate δ = 0.0250
Tax advantage τ = 0.3500
Steady-state Financial Condition ε = 0.1989
Steady-state average benefit costs before 1990 φpre90ave = 0.0607
Steady-state maximum quasi-fixed costs before 1990 φpre90max = 0.1027
Steady-state average benefit costs after 1990 φpost90ave = 0.0778
Steady-state maximum quasi-fixed costs after 1990 φpost90max = 0.4527
Benefits-employment relationship before 1990 gpre90 = 0.7016
Benefits-employment relationship after 1990 gpost90 = 1.3523
Financial structure adjustment cost parameter κ = 5
Standard deviation of the productivity shock σz = 0.0086
Standard deviation of the financial shock σε = 0.0108




Source: See the Parameterization section for the calibration details.
Note: The parameters with ∗ vary slightly with the different values of φ. The Values reported
in this table are the ones used for the regime where gpost90 = 1.3523 and φpost90max = 0.4527. The
shock process matrix’s eigenvalue modulus is 0.8471, thus the shock process is stationary.
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Figure A.10: Employment Cycle Results, Post-1990
(gpost90 = 1.3523, φpost90max = 0.4527)
Source: BLS, and author’s calculations.
Note: The data is HP-filtered. All results include productivity shocks.
Takeaway: My full model results with both benefit cost and financial condition mechanisms best
match with the employment data. The model results with only benefit costs match well with the
timing delay of employment recoveries, but not as well for employment volatility. The volatility
is improved by further including financial conditions and thus the interactions between the two
mechanisms.
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Figure A.11: Employment Cycle Results, Post-1990
(gpost90 = 1.3523, φpost90ave = 0.0778)
Source: BLS, and author’s calculations.
Note: The data is HP-filtered. All results include productivity shocks.
Takeaway: The model results are marginally affected by a more moderate estimate of benefit
costs.
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Figure A.12: Cumulative Employment Growth Results
since Each NBER Business Cycle Trough
Source: BLS, and author’s calculations.
Note: Employment growth results are based on the modeled employment which is calculated
by adding the data trend to the model-generated cyclical components of employment. For the
model results with maximum φ, the pre-1990 results use φpre90max = 0.1027 and the post-1990
results use φpost90max = 0.4527. For the model results with average φ, the pre-1990 results use
φpre90ave = 0.0607 and the post-1990 results use φpost90ave = 0.0778. All results include productivity
shocks.
Takeaway: The delays of employment recoveries are driven by both benefit cost mechanism and
financial conditions in this model. With φpost90max, the model generates 3-to-7-quarter delays,
very close to 3-6 quarters in the data. With φpost90ave, the model results remain, even though the
delays are slightly shortened and volatility is weakened.
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Figure A.13: Cumulative Employment Growth Results
since Each NBER Business Cycle Trough
Source: BLS, and author’s calculations.
Note: Employment growth results are based on the modeled employment which is calculated
by adding the data trend to the model-generated cyclical components of employment. In this
plot, the model results use maximum φ, the pre-1990 results use φpre90max = 0.1027 and the post-
1990 results use φpost90max = 0.4527. All results include productivity shocks, particularly the
results here do not include financial conditions nor use n′.
Takeaway: Cyclical benefit costs generate much better results than fixed benefit costs.
100
Figure A.14: Impulse Responses to One-Time Productivity Shock
(gpost90 = 1.3523, φpost90max = 0.4527)
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Figure A.15: Impulse Responses to One-Time Financial Shock
(gpost90 = 1.3523, φpost90max = 0.4527)
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Figure A.16: Employment Cycle Results, Pre-1990
(gpre90 = 0.7016, φpre90max = 0.1027)
Source: BLS, and author’s calculations.
Note: The data is HP-filtered. The model using average φpre90ave = 0.0607 generates very similar
results. All results include productivity shocks.
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Table A.4: Business Cycle Standard Deviations, 1990-2010
Model
(1) Data (2) Full (φmax) (3) Full (φave) (4) No Friction
Output 0.0149 0.0186 0.0235 0.0161
Employment 0.0142 0.0133 0.0172 0.0054
Per Worker Hours 0.0042 0.0103 0.0236 0.0054
Source: BLS, and author’s calculations.
Note: No Friction refers to the standard model without benefit costs or financial conditions.
The data is HP-filtered.
Table A.5: Business Cycle Standard Deviations, 1964-1989
Model
(1) Data (2) Full (φmax) (3) Full (φave) (4) No Friction
Output 0.0235 0.0201 0.0201 0.0229
Employment 0.0166 0.0093 0.0088 0.0076
Per Worker Hours 0.0047 0.0154 0.0146 0.0076
Source: BLS, and author’s calculations.
Note: No Friction refers to the standard model without benefit costs or financial conditions.
The data is HP-filtered.
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Figure A.17: Employment and Output Cycle Results,
10 Quarters since Each NBER Business Cycle Trough
Source: BLS, NIPA, and author’s calculations.
Note: For the model results with maximum φ, the pre-1990 results use φpre90max = 0.1027 and
the post-1990 results use φpost90max = 0.4527. For the model results with average φ, the pre-1990
results use φpre90ave = 0.0607 and the post-1990 results use φpost90ave = 0.0778. All results include
productivity shocks.
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Figure A.18: Employment and Per Worker Hours Cycle Results,
10 Quarters since Each NBER Business Cycle Trough
Source: BLS, and author’s calculations.
Note: For the model results with maximum φ, the pre-1990 results use φpre90max = 0.1027 and
the post-1990 results use φpost90max = 0.4527. For the model results with average φ, the pre-1990




APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
Technical Details
Consider a multinational bank operating in m countries. The multinational
has one subsidiary bank in each of its host country i with total assets Ai, Ai is




i=1(1 − ki)(1 − ti)Pi −
∑m
i=1Ci −Cp
s.t. Pi = liLi − rBi,
where Li is subsidiary-bank-made loans to borrowers with interest rate li and
rBi is its interest expenses from debt Bi with interest rate r;Ci =
mi(rEi)Aib2i
2 , in which
bi = Bi/Ai, and mi(rEi) is positive and an increasing function of the subsidiary





2 , where gp(rEp) is positive and
an increasing function in the capital requirement faced by the parent bank, the
parent asset Ap =
∑m
i=1 Ai, and qi = Ai/Ap ; Ai = Li+FAi = Bi+Ei, where Ai is given
thus Ap is given too.
Finally, the outside owners of subsidiary bank, possessing ki share of the
subsidiary bank, require return n: kiPi(1−ti)Ei−FA − 1 = n.
Substituting constraints into parent bank’s maximization problem, we can
rewrite the problem as below. Parent bank maximizes with respect to Li and Bi:
max
∑m










From the first order condition for Bi, we have:
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−(1 − ti)[r − 1+n1−ti ] − mi(rEi)bi − gp(rEp)
∑m
i=1 biqi = 0,
mi(rEi)bi = −(1 − ti)r + (1 + n) − gp(rEp)∑mi=1 biqi.
Since
∑m
i=1 biqi = bi −
∑m
j,i(bi − b j)q j, we can rewrite the above equation as:
mi(rEi)bi = tir − r + (1 + n) − gp(rEp)[bi −∑mj,i(bi − b j)q j],
[gp(rEp) + mi(rEi)]bi = tir − r + (1 + n) + gp(rEp)∑mj,i(bi − b j)q j.
And because mi(rEi)bi − m j(rE j)b j = (ti − t j)r, thus we have:




Therefore, [gp(rEp) + mi(rEi)]bi = tir − r + (1 + n) + gp(rEp)rmi(rEi)
∑m




j,i[b j(m j(rE j) − mi(rEi))]q j, and
bi = λ0i + λ1iti + λ2i
∑m
j,i(ti − t j)q j + λ3i
∑m
j,i[b j(m j(rE j) − mi(rEi))]q j,










Because λ1i and λ2i are positive, bi increases with ti and
∑m
j,i(ti − t j)q j. More-
over, since mi(rEi) and gp(rEp) are positive and increasing functions of rEi and rEp,
respectively, the impacts of taxes on bi, i.e. λ1i and λ2i, are negatively related
with rEi and rEp.
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Figure B.1: Subsidiary Bank Leverage Histogram
Source: Bankscope and authors’ calculations.
Note: This figure presents the distribution of subsidiary bank leverage in our sample. The
leverage is calculated as total-liability-to-total-assets ratio (in percent). The distribution is
highly skewed to the right. Therefore, quantile regressions that give less weight to outliers
should help accounting for the skewness.
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Table B.1: Variable Constructions and Sources
Source: Various, see above.
Note: The sample consists of 558 subsidiary commercial banks of 86 largest multinational
banks in the world for 1998-2011. The frequency of the sample is annual.
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Subsidiaries of Multinational Banks
Source: See Table B.1.
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of the subsidiary bank leverage, tax variables,
and other subsidiary-level and host-country-level variables. See Table 1 for the description
of variables. Note that some observations have lower capital ratio (inverse of the leverage)
than the minimum capital requirement; it is because we calculate leverage using total assets,
instead of risk-weighted assets due to data availability. The sample consists of 558 subsidiary
commercial banks of 86 largest multinational banks in the world for 1998-2011. The frequency
of the sample is annual. The total number of subsidiary-year observations is 3,905.
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Table B.3: Correlations among Variables
Source: See Table B.1.
Note: See Table B.1 for the description of variables.
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Table B.4: Number of Banks in Each Country, 1998-2011
Source: See Table B.1.
Note: This table lists the number of parent banks and subsidiaries in the sample. Intermediate
companies, which are both parents and subsidiaries, are counted as subsidiaries only. Domestic
subsidiary banks are those whose home country is also the residing country; foreign subsidiary
banks are those whose home country is not the residing country.
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Table B.5: Sample Averages of Bank Leverage and Tax Variables, 1998-2011
Source: See Table B.1.
Note: See Table B.1 for the description of variables.
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Table B.6: Baseline Estimation Results
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for subsidiary bank leverage, estimated over
the 1998-2011 period. The dependent variable is bank leverage, defined as total-liability-
to-total-assets ratio of a subsidiary bank. We use subsidiary-asset-weighted average tax
differences between a subsidiary and the other subsidiaries of the same parent as a measure
for International tax difference variable. See Table B.1 for the description of other independent
variables included in the regressions. In column (1) we show regression with only local tax level
and bank specific variables, and column (2) we add the International tax difference variable.
Column (3) includes country-specific variables in addition to the variables included in column
(1), and column (4) further add the International tax difference variable. Column (4) is our
benchmark regression. Host country fixed effects are included in all specifications. Expected
signs are in parentheses beneath each variable, robust t-statistics are in parentheses beneath
each coefficient; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table B.7: Robustness Check Estimation Results: Standard Errors
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for subsidiary bank leverage, estimated over
the 1998-2011 period. The dependent variable is bank leverage, defined as total-liability-to-
total-assets ratio of a subsidiary bank. We use different standard error correction techniques to
check the robustness of our results. See Table B.1 for the description of independent variables
included in the regressions. Column (5)-(7) specify that the standard errors allow for intragroup
correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that the observations are independent. That is, the
observations are independent across clusters but not necessarily within them. Column (5)-(7)
designate the clusters to be multinational banks (i.e., the parents of subsidiary banks), the host
countries of subsidiary banks, and subsidiary banks, respectively. Column (8) employs Driscoll
and Kraay standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the
error structures. Host country fixed effects are included in all specifications. Expected signs
are in parentheses beneath each variable, corrected t-statistics are in parentheses beneath each
coefficient; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table B.8: Robustness Check Estimation Results: Alternatives
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for subsidiary bank leverage using alternative measures of variables,
estimated over the 1998-2011 period. The dependent variable in column (9)-(11) is bank leverage, defined as
total-liability-to-total-assets ratio of a subsidiary bank; whereas, the dependent variable is short-term leverage in
column (12), defined as total leverage minus long-term-funding-to-total-assets ratio. In column (9)-(11), we use three
alternative measures for international tax difference. Column (9) employs subsidiary-asset-weighted average tax rate
for a multinational bank. Column (10) uses a similar international tax difference measure as in Table 6, that is the
subsidiary-asset-weighted tax differences between a subsidiary and the other subsidiaries of the same parent, except
here the asset-weights are equal to the average of the subsidiary-asset-weights across time. Using time-invariant
weights helps eliminating a possible endogeneity problem between asset-based weights and leverage. In column (11),
time-varying subsidiary-liability-weights are used instead. See Table B.1 for the description of other independent
variables included in the regressions. Host country fixed effects are included in all specifications. Expected signs are
in parentheses beneath each variable, robust t-statistics are in parentheses beneath each coefficient; *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table B.9: Robustness Check Estimation Results: Leverage Skewness and
Tax Trend
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: This table reports quantile regression and OLS regression results for subsidiary bank leverage, estimated over
1998-2011 period. Column (13) uses a quantile regression that approximates the conditional median instead of the
mean of the dependent variable, which reduces the impact of outliers. Thus, its estimates should be more robust than
OLS regressions, given that bank leverage is highly skewed, as shown in Fig. B.1. Variance estimates of the quantile
regression are obtained via bootstrapping. Column (14) contains a host-country-specific trend variable that captures
the declining trend in statutory CIT rates worldwide. See Table 1 for the description of independent variables included
in the regressions. Host country fixed effects are included in all specifications. Expected signs are in parentheses
beneath each variable, robust t-statistics are in parentheses beneath each coefficient; *, **, *** denote significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table B.10: Robustness Check Estimation Results: Subsamples
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for subsidiary bank leverage using different
subsets of our entire sample, estimated over 1998-2011 period, except for column (18). Column
(15) uses data from unconsolidated bank statements only. Column (16) excludes subsidiary
banks with zero or negative profit. Column (17) contains subsidiary banks that reside in
advanced countries, which are defined as countries where domestic credit provided by the
banking sector as a share of GDP is higher than the sample average. Column (18) excludes the
data from 2009 to 2011. See Table B.1 for the description of independent variables included in
the regressions. Host country fixed effects are included in all specifications. Expected signs
are in parentheses beneath each variable, robust t-statistics are in parentheses beneath each
coefficient; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table B.11: Estimation Results: Capital Tightness
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for subsidiary bank leverage using two subsamples, estimated over
1998-2011 period. We start with dividing subsidiaries banks into three equal-size groups: banks with abundant capital,
median capital, and tight capital, relative to the capital requirement they face. Dropping the middle group, we regress
bank leverage using the observations with most abundant capital in column (19) and tightest capital in column (20),
respectively. More specifically, capital-abundant banks at each date are those with a ratio of equity-to-total-assets
exceeding the minimum capital requirement by 3 percentage points, while capital-tight banks at each date are those
with the ratio less than the minimum capital requirement by 1.2 percentage points. In our sample, it is possible for a
bank to have equity ratio less than the minimum capital requirement because equity is divided over total assets instead
of risk-weighted assets due to data availability. See Table B.1 for the description of independent variables included in
the regressions. Host country fixed effects are included in all specifications. Expected signs are in parentheses beneath
each variable, robust t-statistics are in parentheses beneath each coefficient; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and
1 percent level, respectively.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
Data Sources
Default events: Reinhart (2010)
Exchange rates, trade, GDP: CEIC database
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Figure C.1: Iceland GDP Growth upon Default (2007-2010)
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: According to Reinhart (2010), Iceland defaulted from 2007-2010.
Takeaway: At most one third of the post-default output loss actually comes from reduced pro-
duction activities.
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Figure C.2: Iceland Real Exchange Rates upon Default (2007-2010)
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: According to Reinhart (2010), Iceland defaulted from 2007-2010. Here that I pick Iceland
is because it has been having free floating exchange rate regime at the time of defaults. Certainly,
there are other countries that can be presented too, Iceland only serves as an example here for
now.
Takeaway: REER depreciated about 30 percent upon defaults in Iceland.
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Figure C.3: Iceland Trade upon Default (2007-2010)
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: According to Reinhart (2010), Iceland defaulted from 2007-2010.
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Table C.1: Parametrization
Discount factor β = 0.953
Risk aversion α = 2.000
Elasticity of substitution parameter ρ = −0.350
Home/foreign goods share θ1 = 1 − θ2 = 0.667
Financial market re-entry probability re = 0.800
Country 2’s currency depreciation upon its default loss = 0.100
Stochastic structure of country 2’s output corr = 0.945, std = 0.025
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Figure C.4: Savings Function and Bond Price
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Different states are distinguished by default country’s endowment shocks.
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Figure C.5: Exchange Rate and Trade
Source: Author’s calculations.




Note: Different states are distinguished by default country’s endowment shocks.
128
Figure C.7: Creditor Country 1’s Welfare
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Different states are distinguished by default country’s endowment shocks.
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